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Assimilation to the United States: A Study of
the Adjustment of Status and the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Statutes
Joe A. Tucker*
We do almost no single sensible and deliberate thing to make family
life a success. And still the family survives. It has survived all manner
of stupidity. It will survive the application of intelligence.
-Walter Lippmann**
I. Introduction
A couple, who for the purposes of this article shall be identified as
the Smiths, a citizen and nonimmigrant student, met and began dat-
ing in 1984. By 1985 their relationship had progressed to the point
that they were living together. Although the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service (INS or Service)' filed deportation proceedings
against the alien during the same year for overstaying a student visa,
the couple was probably unconcerned, as they planned to marry.
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1. The INS is the agency that has jurisdiction to enforce the immigration laws inside
the United States. A. Fragomen & S. Bell, Immigration Primer 6-8 (1985) [hereinafter
Immigration Primer]. Although the immigration statute provides that the Attorney
General has this responsibility, in practice most of this authority is delegated to the
Commissioner of the INS. 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law & Procedure
§ 1.7b (rev. ed. 1987). The Attorney General has further delegated the authority to
review immigration judge decisions to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), a sepa-
rate branch of the Department of Justice. Id. at § 1.1Ob. The appellate decisions of the
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Since the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA)2 permitted
the spouses of citizens to acquire permanent residency by adjust-
ment of status 3 without leaving the country, their lack of concern
seemed reasonable. The Smiths applied for a marriage license in the
summer of 1986. There was no ostensible cause for haste since the
deportation proceedings were still continuing at their customary le-
thargic pace. On November 10, 1986, however, Congress enacted
the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986 (IMFA).
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Oblivious to the passage of the IMFA, the couple married four days
later. This was a profound mistake if the couple had any interest in
commencing their marital life together without departing the
country.
Had the Smiths received legal counselling before marriage, they
would have been advised of the steps necessary to maintain their
union under the IMFA. First, and foremost, do not marry during the
pendency of deportation proceedings. Instead, have Mr. Smith ob-
tain "voluntary departure" 5 and leave the country. Then, get mar-
ried abroad. Finally, have Mrs. Smith apply for Mr. Smith's
admission at a United States consulate abroad. This last step would
BIA, unless overruled by the Attorney General, are binding on the INS. The Depart-
ment of State, on the other hand, exercises extra-territorial jurisdiction over immigra-
tion. Immigration Primer, supra, at 6. Through its Bureau of Consular Affairs, the State
Department grants admission visas to aliens. Id.
2. Immigration & Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) [hereinafter INA].
3. Under the INA, every alien seeking admission is presumed to have the intention
of permanently immigrating to the United States unless she can demonstrate qualifica-
tion for one of the defined nonimmigrant statutory classifications. INA § 101(a)(15), 8
U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(15) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Nonimmigrants are not subject to quota
limitations since they are only temporarily admitted to the country for a limited purpose.
Tourists, business people, or students, for example, generally fall under this category.
Individuals in this category are expected to leave the country once their authorized ac-
tivity has been completed. In contrast, a permanent resident alien has "the status of
having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United
States." INA § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(20) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Adjustment
of status permits an alien to become a legal permanent resident without leaving the
country if statutory qualification for residency can be demonstrated. Immigration Pri-
mer, supra note 1, at 67-71. Although the alien is required to be "admitted and inspected
or paroled" into the country by the appropriate official, before the law changed in 1986
she could still apply for adjustment even if her status later became unlawful. Id. at 67-
68. Under current law regarding the adjustment of status this is no longer true in many
cases. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
4. Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
5. Voluntary departure is an administrative device which permits the alien to leave
the country without the necessity of holding a deportation hearing. Immigration Pri-
mer, supra note 1, at 274-75. In addition to allowing the INS to avoid the cost of a
hearing, this device saves the taxpayers' money by requiring the alien to pay her own
transportation costs. In return for leaving voluntarily, the alien is permitted to return to
the United States, without being subject to the five year statutory exclusion for deporta-
tion, if a statutory ground for admission is later acquired. Id.
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bear some risk since even an unlawful denial of a visa by a consular
officer is not subject to judicial review. If all went well, however, the
couple could expect to be reunited in the United States in about
three months, and, under the IMFA's conditional status provision,
Mr. Smith would receive permanent resident status on a two year
conditional basis. Even then, Mr. Smith would be in a precarious
position. Mrs. Smith would, in effect, have the de facto power to
effectuate her husband's deportation during the two year period if
she became disenchanted with him. Moreover, the birth of children
to the couple before the grant of conditional status would not pro-
vide equitable grounds to defer Mr. Smith's deportation. Even after
the termination of the two year period, Mr. Smith would be well
advised to proceed cautiously. If he remarried within five years, he
might be required to demonstrate to the INS, by "clear and convinc-
ing evidence," that his previous marriage to the former Mrs. Smith
was not fraudulent.
By marrying during the pendency of deportation the Smiths un-
knowingly effected the summary termination of the deportation pro-
ceedings. Under these circumstances, the IMFA created an
irrebuttable presumption of fraudulent intent to circumvent the im-
migration laws and mandated that Mr. Smith depart the country for
two years before the grant of any immigration benefits derived from
his marital relationship. Since the marriage was not recognized as
legal by the IMFA, the Service did not provide the Smiths opportu-
nity to demonstrate its validity. Moreover, the law's effect would
have been the same even if the Smiths had children. The IMFA
therefore presented Mrs. Smith with two undesirable options. She
could test the marriage's durability by agreeing to a two year separa-
tion, or, in the alternative, accompany her husband into exile. This
latter alternative would have entailed separation from other family
members and friends, the loss of employment in the United States,
and various other cultural disadvantages. Instead, the Smiths chose
an option not designated by the IMFA. They filed a lawsuit in fed-
eral district court challenging the law's constitutionality and assert-
ing that "they are a loving, devoted couple whose marriage was not
intended in any way to circumvent the immigration laws." 6 The gra-
vamen of the Smiths' complaint was that they were constitutionally




entitled to a marriage validity hearing before the denial of immigra-
tion benefits. 7 The federal district court judge, however, upheld the
IMFA and denied the Smiths relief."
It is understandable that the Smiths were ignorant of the IMFA's
enactment. Mere days before its passage, Congress passed the Im-
migration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).9 IRCA created
employee reporting and verification provisions affecting the hiring
procedures of employers throughout the nation, and a legalization
program that offered lawful immigration status to aliens who
demonstrated long-standing unlawful residence in the country.
Since these measures affected millions of individuals, their enact-
ment diverted attention both from subsidiary provisions of IRCA,
which restricted the ability of aliens within the country to adjust to
permanent residence status, and from the adoption of the IMFA
four days later. As the Smiths discovered, the IMFA and amended
adjustment of status provisions cause considerable disruption in the
lives of citizens and permanent resident aliens who are married to,
or planning to marry, aliens. The most significant implication of the
neglected enactments, however, may be that they portend congres-
sional intent to shift the emphasis of immigration law away from its
historical commitment to preservation of nuclear family unity.
Family reunification is the INA's primary admission criterion, and
avoiding the separation of nuclear families its highest priority. The
INA authorizes the unlimited entry of "immediate relatives," de-
fined as the spouses, children, or parents of citizens. Aliens seeking
permanent admission are subject to a hierarchical preference system
with a world-wide annual quota of 270,000 and a per country ceiling
7. Smith v. I.N.S., 684 F. Supp. 1113, 1117-18 (D. Mass. 1988).
8. 684 F. Supp. at 1120. For similar holdings, see Anetekhai v. I.N.S., 685 F. Supp.
599 (E.D. La. 1988) (upholding INA § 204(h) against due process and equal protection
attack); Escobar v. I.N.S., 700 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1988) (same). See also Montague v.
Meese, 683 F. Supp. 589 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (dismissing a constitutional challenge against
the same statute on the grounds that the unmarried plaintiffs lacked standing). At the
time of this writing several other cases raising similar claims were pending before the
federal courts or the BIA. See Manwani v. I.N.S., No. C-C-88-41-M (W.D.N.C. filed Jan.
26, 1988), reviewed in 65 Interpreter Releases 1097 (1988) (couple with a relationship of
four years duration before institution of deportation proceeding); Azzizi v. Meese, Civ.
No. H-87-957 (AHN) (D. Conn. 1988); Alamario v. Attorney General, No. 87-CV-
73219-DT (E.D. Mich. filed Aug. 28, 1987); Matter of Lamgaday, A24 450 291 (BIA
1987), reviewed in 64 Interpreter Releases 1094, 1097 (1987).
9. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News (100 Stat.) 3359 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of titles 7, 8, 26, 42, and 50 of the U.S. Code) [hereinafter
IRCA].
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of 20,000.10 Eighty percent of the 270,000 immigrant visas are re-
served for relatives of citizens and permanent residents, while the
remaining twenty percent are allocated to aliens having desirable
occupational skills." Special treatment is afforded marital relation-
ships, as citizens' spouses are immediate relatives entitled to unlim-
ited entry, and permanent residents' spouses are admitted as
"second preference" immigrants. Marriage to a citizen or resident
alien also enables the alien applicant to qualify for numerous other
statutory benefits.' 2 In addition to the visa system, the INA also
permits qualified aliens in this country to become permanent resi-
dents by adjustment of status, a process which accounts for one
quarter of the total annual legal admissions.'
3
The current immigration admission system is impaired by several
deficiencies. First, its intended liberal reunification of nuclear fami-
lies is imperfect in application. Since the spouses of permanent resi-
dents, as second preference immigrants, are subject to a severely
backlogged quota system, they often endure waits of approximately
two to ten years for visas.' 4 As the bipartisan Select Commission on
Immigration and Refugee Policy (Select Commission) indicated in
its 1981 Final Report,' 5 extended separation of families provides
10. INA §§ 201(a), 202(a), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(a), 1152(a) (1982).
11. INA § 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The preference allocation
system based on family relationships is as follows: first preference is reserved for the
unmarried sons and daughters of citizens (20%); second preference immigrants are the
spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of permanent resident aliens (26%); the
fourth preference is for married sons and daughters of citizens (10%); and the fifth pref-
erence admits the brothers and sisters of citizens (24%). The third and sixth prefer-
ences of admission, each making up 10% of the quota visas, are occupational categories.
12. A second preference spouse may expedite entry by charging her admission to a
foreign country other than her nation of origin. INA § 202(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1152(b) (1982
& Supp. IV 1986). In addition, marriage to a citizen may either lessen to three years, or
entirely forgive, the required five year residency in the United States to gain naturaliza-
tion. INA § 319(a), (b), 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a), (b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Marriage to a
citizen or permanent resident also enables the alien to apply for waivers of certain statu-
tory grounds of deportation or exclusion. Roberts, Marital Status and the Alien, 62 In-
terpreter Releases 64, 65-66 (1985) [hereinafter Marital Status].
13. Adjustment of status accounted for the following percentages of annual immi-
grant admission for the indicated fiscal years: 1978, 25.9%; 1979, 22.7%; 1980, 25.1%;
and 1981, 23.9%. See T. Aleinikoff& D. Martin, Immigration: Process and Policy 288
(1985) (citing from the 1981 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. (1982)) [hereinafter Immigration Process & Policy].
14. S. Rep. No. 290, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1988) [hereinafter Senate Report of
1988].
15. Select Comm'n on Immigration and Refugee Policy, U.S. Immigration Policy
and the National Interest, Final Report 14-15 (1981) [hereinafter SCIRP]. The Select
Commission was established by Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. 95-412, 92 Stat. 907. Its
study of the immigration laws was intended to comprise "an objective and thorough...
[review] beyond the capacity and scope of a single agency of the executive branch or
[congressional] committee." Fuchs, Immigration Policy and the Rule of Law, 44 U. Pitt.
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strong incentives for illegal entry or fraudulent circumvention of the
immigration laws. Second, the preferential treatment of nuclear
family immigrants has been condemned as nepotism that disadvan-
tages economically beneficial "new seed" professional and investor
immigrants. 6 Moreover, there has been apprehension that the ex-
panding number of immediate relative admissions, exempted from
numerical limitation, constitutes a potentially unlimited source of
immigration. 17 Comparative studies have demonstrated that the
United States, in contrast to other major immigrant-receiving na-
tions, admits the lowest percentage of skilled aliens and almost no
foreign investors. Several of these studies therefore recommended
emulation of the Canadian and Australian immigration systems by
use of a "point" system to evaluate the favorable educational, occu-
pational, and investor attributes of applicants.i8 Alarmed by the
growing number of relative admissions, influential legislators have
stressed the need to limit entry of these aliens and expand the ad-
mission of skilled immigrants and investors.i 9
The Kennedy-Simpson Bill, considered during the 100th Con-
gress, proposes several reforms to address these concerns. 20 The
proposed legislation sets a total immigration cap of 590,000 and di-
vides relative and occupational immigration into separate categories
L. Rev. 433, 437 (1983) (quoting Senator Edward M. Kennedy, chair of Senate Judiciary
Committee).
16. See, e.g., Lochhead, Giving Immigration Points to the Skilled and Educated, In-
sight, Sept. 5, 1988, at 40; Immigration Primer, supra note 1, at 2-3.
17. Simpson, Legal Immigration Reform, 25 San Diego L. Rev. 215, 216 (1988) (in-
dicating that the number of immediate relatives admissions has been increasing by 7%
per year, as evinced by the 1976 level of 114,000 in contrast to 223,000 admitted in
1986). But cf. Immigration Reform: The Kennedy-Simpson "Immigration Act of 1988,"
7 Immigr. L. Rep. 37, 38 (1988) (referring to a General Accounting Office report that
"immediate relative immigration has been steady at about 220,000 per year, and pre-
dictable within a range of 6-8 percent") [hereinafter Immigration Reform].
18. See, e.g., Chiswick, An Alternative Approach to Immigration Policy: Rationing by
Skill, 2 Population Res. & Pol'y Rev. 21 (1983); Comment, Immmigration for Investors:
A Comparative Analysis of U.S., Canadian, and Australian Policies, 7 B.C. Int'l & Comp.
L. Rev. 113 (1984).
19. See, e.g., Simpson, Legal Immigration Reform, 25 San Diego L. Rev. 215 (1988)
(comments of United States Senator Alan K. Simpson, ranking minority member of the
Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs); Remarks of United States
Senator Richard G. Lugar, 1988 Immigration Law Seminar, at the Indiana University
School of Law-Indianapolis (reported by Indianapolis Star, Feb. 10, 1988, at D-3).
20. S. 2104, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reviewed in 64 Interpreter Releases 151
(1988); see also Immigration Reform, supra note 17, at 37. The bill's proposed reforms
that are discussed in this Article can be found in Senate Report of 1988, supra note 14, at
3-6, 12-19. Similar legislation was introduced in the preceding congressional session in
the Kennedy-Donnelly Bill. S. 1611, 100th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1987) (discussed in Immi-
gration Reform: The Mazzoli Efficiency Bill and the Kennedy-Donnelly Bill, 6 Immigr. L.
Rep. 169 (1987)).
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with respective limits of 470,000 and 120,000. In addition to imple-
menting a revolutionary cap on family immigration, the Bill also
subtracts the number of immediate relatives admitted from the total
relative ceiling of 470,000. Admission as an independent or occupa-
tional immigrant is determined by a point system evaluating the ap-
plicant's level of education and occupational skills. The Bill
reserves 5,000 visas from this category for aliens investing at least
$1 million and employing 10 or more persons.21
The evolution of immigration policy's devaluation of family unity
can be fully understood only by analysis of the interrelationship of
IRCA, the IMFA, and legislation modeled on the Kennedy-Simpson
Bill. Versions of almost all the proposals of these acts were origi-
nally part of a single bill introduced several times during the early
1980s. 22 Sponsors of that legislation, however, were eventually
compelled to separately introduce these measures since joint pas-
sage proved too controversial. 23 These laws exhibit a similar insen-
sitivity to the interests of family unity. The IMFA's conditional
status burdens marital relationships, renders irrelevant assimilative
factors that otherwise provide grounds for admission, and, in cer-
tain circumstances, allows the deportation of citizens' and perma-
nent residents' spouses without a hearing. IRCA's denial of
permanent residence to specified aliens within the country extends
the contemporary nonassimilative trend of the immigration laws be-
yond marital relationships. Although the ostensible rationale for
these statutes is fraud prevention, many of their provisions are cred-
ibly explained only by reference to the Kennedy-Simpson Bill's
21. See Immigration Reform, supra note 17, at 43. The Bill orginally set the mini-
mum investment amount at $2 million, but was amended at the initiative of Senator Phil
Gramm. Id.
22. Popularly known as the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill, this legislation was clearly the
grandfather of the IRCA and Kennedy-Simpson Bill. Among its many provisions, the
Simpson-Mazzoli Bill recommended employer sanctions, a legalization program, a cap
on relative immigration, creation of independent immigrant and foreign investor cate-
gories, and restriction of adjustment of status. See Text and Discussion of Simpson-
Mazzoli Bill, 59 Interpreter Releases 248 (1982). The legislation, with various amend-
ments, was unsuccessfully proposed several times during the early 1980s. See, e.g., N.
Montwieler, The Immigration Reform Law of 1986, at 19-22 (1987); Eig & Vialet, Com-
prehensive Immigration Reform: History and Current Status, 1 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 27
(1985) [hereinafter Immigration Reform History].
23. In 1985, the sponsors of Simpson-Mazzoli decided to postpone quota system
reforms in order to pass IRCA's regulation of illegal immigration. See Immigration Re-
form History, supra note 22, at 39. The Kennedy-Simpson Bill, however, is clearly in-
tended as a continuation of the original intention to effectuate quota reform. See Senate
Report of 1988, supra note 14, at 3 ("The committee believes the time has come for
Congress to take up where it left off in 1986 and address the unfinished agenda of immi-
gration-the reform of our legal immigration system.") (emphasis in original).
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movement of immigration law away from its family reunification em-
phasis. The Kennedy-Simpson Bill ensures the admission of occu-
pational and investor immigrants by placing their visas on a separate
track from the over-subscribed family immigrant visa track.
Although the legislation continues to allow liberal immigration of
immediate relatives, it subtracts their admission from the annual rel-
ative ceiling, thereby reducing the visas available to other relatives.
Given IRCA's legalization of two million aliens, who will soon seek
the admission of their relatives, it is probable that second prefer-
ence entry will remain subject to considerable delay.
24
This Article does not question the need to revise immigration pol-
icy to redress the imbalance between relative and occupational or
investor immigration, but asserts that reform is possible without un-
necessarily dismantling nuclear family relationships. The Article
contends that many of the fraud prevention purposes of the IMFA
and IRCA could be achieved by moderating the harsh provisions of
these statutes. Humane reform of the quota system to decrease the
backlog of second preference visas and avoid lengthy separation of
families without appreciably increasing immigration 25 would also re-
move powerful incentives to violate the law. Although the new en-
actments purport to derive from the recommendations of the Select
Commission, in many respects they significantly depart from the
Commission's reform proposals. 26 This Article also proposes that
greater attention to the Select Commission's recommendations
24. See Immigration Reform, supra note 17, at 38; Guendelsberger, Implementing
Family Unification Rights in American Immigration Law: Proposed Amendments, 25
San Diego L. Rev. 253, 254 (1988) [hereinafter Family Reunification Rights]. The INS
projects that even under the proposed Kennedy-Simpson immigration levels, by 1996
the visa waiting list will be backlogged by 700,000 applicants. See INS Proposals for
Legal Immigration Reform, 7 Immigr. L. Rep. 49, 50 (1988).
25. See, e.g., INS Proposals for Legal Immigration Reform, supra note 24, at 51 (dis-
cussing the INS's proposal to eliminate family separation for second preference immi-
grants by permitting immediate immigration of any nuclear family member
"accompanying or following to join" within three years of the permanent resident's ap-
plication); Family Reunification Rights, supra note 24, at 273 (recommending that per-
manent resident nuclear families be afforded the same quota exemption as citizen
immediate relatives, to avoid separation). Neither of these proposals would expand im-
migrant admission beyond the levels suggested by the Kennedy-Simpson Bill since they
recommend compensating reductions of non-nuclear-family relative admission.
26. See, e.g., Senate Report of 1988, supra note 14, at 4 (legislative history of the
Kennedy-Simpson Bill tracing many of its proposals to the Select Commission's recom-
mendations); H.R. Rep. No. 682(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 5649, 5658 (indicating the Select Commission's similar influence
on IRCA). The new law's impact on family unity and adjustment of status, however, is
inconsistent with the Select Commission's proposals. See infra notes 150-57 and accom-
panying text. The institution of an admission point system is also contrary to the Select
Commission's recommendations. Immigration Process & Policy, supra note 13, at 175.
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would aid the development of a more efficient and equitable family
unity and adjustment of status policy.
Section II of this Article provides a statutory analysis of the effects
of, and interrelationship between, the IMFA and IRCA's adjustment
of status laws. The section concludes that these statutes are of
doubtful effectiveness as fraud prevention devices, but clearly insti-
tute an over-inclusive system of harsh presumptions working against
assimilative and communitarian concerns. Section III assesses the
efficiency and precision of the legislation under administrative and
regulatory theory. The adoption of onerous statutes, coupled with
congressional failure to implement meaningful reform, contributes
to the immigration bureaucracy's demonstrably ineffectual imple-
mentation of the immigration laws. In offering a "theory of effective
immigration administration," the section attempts to explain why
these inequitable enactments are also inefficient. Section IV pro-
vides a constitutional appraisal of the statutes' validity and asserts
that the IMFA offers the judiciary compelling reasons to overcome
its deep-seated reluctance to subject immigration legislation to
meaningful review. This section argues that the IMFA provides a
test vehicle to ascertain whether immigration law has been encom-
passed by the mainstream of constitutional jurisprudence. In for-
mulating this analysis, Section IV contends that a channeling
function designated as the "atrium principle," applied in the con-
text of developing communitarian and dignitary theories, provides a
comprehensible foundation for judicial review that avoids judicial
immersion in the intricacies of political decision-making. Finally,
Section V asserts that Congress could deemphasize family reunifica-
tion and regulate the incidence of fraud without damaging the inter-
ests of existing family relations. The section concludes by offering
recommendations to reduce the unnecessarily harsh effect of the
laws, while preserving the fundamental regulatory purpose.
II. Statutory Analysis
The backgrounds of the enactment of the IMFA and IRCA are
strikingly analogous. Passage of IRCA was facilitated by statistical
assertions that enormous hordes of aliens had unlawfully entered
the United States. The problem was publicly described in terms of a
"flood" or a "rising tide of illegal immigration. ' 27 Although the
problem of undocumented immigration by foreigners is genuine
27. A. Anderson, The Hoover Institution, Illegal Aliens and Employer Sanctions:
Solving the Wrong Problem 5 (1986).
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and persistent, proponents of restrictive legislation often supported
their arguments with highly speculative figures. Even INS estimates
of the number of illegal entrants were exaggerated and based upon
faulty statistical techniques, in contrast to figures compiled by the
United States Bureau of the Census and the National Research
Council. 28 Likewise, various members of Congress and other
policymakers resorted to hyperbole to persuade the public of the
necessity of IRCA's enactment.
29
The IMFA's adoption was similarly preceded by intense efforts to
obtain national media coverage accentuating the pervasive nature of
immigration-related marriage fraud.30 As in any political setting,
extensive media exposure influences the tone of legislative consid-
eration and can often predispose the legislature to act without ade-
quate consideration of the issues. Research conducted subsequent
to the IMFA's enactment indicates that Congress relied upon mis-
leading empirical data that overestimates the magnitude of marital
fraud.
The full effect of the IMFA's conditional status can only be appre-
ciated by analyzing its interrelationship to the INA's adjustment of
status provision. The immigration benefits available to conditional
status aliens are severely constrained since once conditional status is
granted on the basis of marriage, the alien may not seek adjustment of status on
any other statutory ground, even if one becomes available. 3 1 As a conse-
quence, the alien's right to remain in the country is contingent upon
the success of her marital relationship for the duration of the condi-
tional period. Whereas other applicants who immigrate on the basis
of a marriage not subject to the probationary term may adjust their
status to other available immigrant categories, conditional status im-
migrants may only qualify for admission on the basis of the marriage
that authorized their initial entry. Through the establishment of an
exclusive marital paradigm for conditional status aliens, the IMFA
28. See id. at 4-6. For a similar analysis, see Corwin, The Numbers Game: Estimates
of Illegal Aliens in the United States, 1970-1981, 45 Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer
1982, at 223.
29. A. Anderson, supra note 27, at 6-7.
30. See Note, The Constitutionality of the INS Sham Marriage Investigation Policy,
99 Harv. L. Rev. 1238, 1241 n.20, 1254 n.97 (1986) (citing Nightline: Marriage
Fraud/Remembering Samantha (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 26, 1985) (interview
with Senator Alan Simpson, chair of the Senate Subcomm. on Immigration); 60 Minutes:
Do You Take this Alien? (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 22, 1985)) [hereinafter Sham
Marriage Investigation]. See also id. at n.96 (reporting other sham marriage media cover-
age); Comment, Alienating Sham Marriages For Tougher Immigration Penalties: Con-
gress Enacts The Marriage Fraud Act, 15 Pepperdine L. Rev. 181, n.17 (1988)
(reporting sham marriage media coverage) [hereinafter Alienating Sham Marriages].
31. INA § 245(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(d) (Supp. IV 1986).
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differentiates those aliens from similarly situated residents by statu-
torily rendering irrelevant assimilative factors or communal associa-
tions that provide grounds of admission for the latter group. The
IMFA also denies adjustment to aliens who marry during the pen-
dency of judicial or administrative proceedings contesting their
right to remain in the country. In denying these individuals any op-
portunity to demonstrate the legitimacy of their marriages, the stat-
ute again demonstrates its indifference toward assimilative familial
interests.
Part A of Section II indicates that faulty empirical data exaggerat-
ing the prevalence of marital fraud influenced Congress's decision
to enact the IMFA. This section also demonstrates that the IMFA
and related statutes either restrict or eliminate immigration benefits
formerly available to the spouses and other family members of citi-
zens and permanent resident aliens. Moreover, the IMFA places
these persons under severe restrictions in the conduct of their pri-
vate familial affairs. Part B of Section II reveals that IRCA's restric-
tive amendment of the INA's adjustment of status provisions, and
administrative implementation actions, may be even more injurious
to family unity since this provision applies to any alien inside the
country who seeks permanent resident status. Finally, Part C of Sec-
tion II argues that although the IMFA and IRCA adjustment of sta-
tus laws are of dubious fraud prevention value, they are indicative of
congressional intent to shift the emphasis of immigration law away
from the goal of family reunification. In this sense, these statutes
can be viewed as precursors to legislation modeled on the Kennedy-
Simpson Bill.
A. Analysis of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments
The State Department's observation that the IMFA is a "complex
Act" 32 is an apt description, since the legislation's full effect can be
understood only by studying its relationship to several scattered sec-
tions of the INA. The confusing and inartfully drafted IMFA cre-
ated a conditional status category for aliens married less than two
years and limited the ability of these individuals to adjust to perma-
nent resident status.33 The Act also expanded the statutory grounds
32. State Dep't Wire No. 86 (Nov. 25, 1986), reprinted in 64 Interpreter Releases 34,
35 (1987).
33. See INA §§ 214(d), 216(g)(l)(B), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1184(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986),
1186a(g)(l)(B) (Supp. IV 1986) (requiring that fiances and fiancees have met in person
no more than two years before the date the alien files a petition for a visa, and applying
conditional status to these marriages). For a discussion of the many drafting errors in
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for excluding aliens from the country for visa or entry fraud, and
increased the criminal penalties for sham marriage fraud. 34
1. Legislative and administrative background of the IMFA. Review
of the IMFA's legislative history demonstrates that Congress was
greatly influenced by INS statistics showing that 30% of immigra-
tion-related marriages were fraudulent,3 5 and by a comparative
study suggesting that conditional status was an effective means of
controlling fraudulent immigration.3 6 Although there was limited
hearing testimony questioning the validity of INS statistical asser-
tions,3 7 Congress found it unpersuasive. During the congressional
hearing, the INS argued that its legal burden of proof to show fraud
was too high and recommended that it be eased.3 8 The INS also
requested enactment of more stringent criminal sanctions, the
adoption of a conditional residence period, and the prohibition of
.adjustment of status after the institution of an administrative expul-
sion proceeding.39 The only significant INS request Congress did
not adopt was its call for a legislative definition of marriage
viability.4
0
several of these provisions, see Ingber & Prischet, The Marriage Fraud Amendments, in
The New Simpson-Rodino Immigration Law Of 1986, at 555 (1986).
34. INA § 212(a)(19), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), was amended
to exclude aliens who have engaged in, or attempted, visa or entry fraud. A questiona-
ble agency interpretation that exclusion for visa or entry fraud has now been rendered
retroactively permanent has increased the IMFA's severity. See New View on § 212(a)(19)
Amendment Retroactivity, 65 Interpreter Releases 84 (1988). INA § 275(b), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1325(b) (Supp. IV 1986), increased the criminal penalties for sham marriage violations
to not more than five years imprisonment and a fine of no more than $250,000.
35. Fraudulent Marriage and Fiance Arrangements to Obtain Permanent Resident
Immigration Status: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1985) (statement of
Alan C. Nelson, Comm'r, INS) [hereinafter Fraud Hearings]. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-906,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5978.
36. General Accounting Office, Immigration Marriage Fraud: Controls in Most
Countries Surveyed Stronger Than in U.S., No. GAO-GGD-86-104BR (1986). There
are difficulties in exporting the conditional status systems of other countries to the
United States. Some foreign nations do not have liberal admission policies; some man-
date conditional status for as long as ten years. Another distinguishing factor is that
foreign conditional status programs function differently than the IMFA's since many of
these nations do not have the United States' long visa wait.
37. Fraud Hearings, supra note 35, at 78, 88 (statement ofJules E. Coven, President,
Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass'n).
38. Id. at 19 (statement of Alan C. Nelson, Comm'r, INS).
39. Id. at 17-20 (statement of Alan C. Nelson). The INS proposal was to prohibit
immigration for one year; the finally adopted IMFA prohibited it for two years. Id. at 5.
40. See id. at 10, 18 (statement of Alan C. Nelson indicating that a statutory definition
of marriage would help in the difficult task of distinguishing "good" and "bad" mar-
riages). Given the preexisting statutory presumption that divorce within two years of
marital immigration benefits indicated fraud, and the absence of an immigration statute
of limitations, the IMFA's enactment is inexplicable without consideration of administra-
tive convenience. In a sense, every alien's status is "conditional"-and was so even
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The State Department, however, did not support adoption of
these INS-backed measures. It testified that the majority of fraudu-
lent cases were detected at the visa interview stage, and suggested
that proper enforcement of existing law might render legislative
amendment unnecessary. 4' In contrast to the INS, the State Depart-
ment believed that "the answer perhaps lies in better utilizing re-
sources presently at our command strengthening both coordination
and cooperation with INS, rather than looking at some across-the-
board legislation.- 42 The unmistakable implication of the State De-
partment testimony was that applicable law was neither aggressively
nor efficiently enforced.
The important distinction between unilateral and bilateral marital
fraud was raised.by INS testimony during congressional hearings.43
In a case of "bilateral" or contractual fraud, both parties intend
from the outset to enter a sham marriage to acquire immigration
benefits. Conversely, in the "unilateral" fraud context, the alien
seeks to deceive the citizen or permanent resident spouse concern-
ing her true intention, and will abandon her spouse after acquisition
of immigration benefits. 44 In the latter instance, the citizen or per-
manent resident spouse often is understandably outraged and will
testify against the alien. Testimony from defrauded spouses pro-
vides considerable assistance to the immigration services in demon-
strating the occurrence of fraud.45 Incidents of unilateral fraud
before the enactment of the IMFA-since the INS may always question whether immi-
gration benefits were properly granted. See Marital Status, supra note 12, at 75-76 (indi-
cating that even after the alien receives citizenship, the agency may seek denaturalization
for improperly granted immigration benefits). In addition, INA § 241 (c) presumes that
any marriage terminated within two years was entered into solely for the acquisition of
immigration benefits. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The INS probably
found the preexisting statutory presumption unsatisfactory because the alien could dis-
prove that presumption by a "preponderance of the evidence." See Baliza v. I.N.S., 709
F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1983). In contrast, the INS had to satisfy the "clear, unequivocal,
and convincing" standard of proof to revoke the alien's status. See, e.g., Woodby v.
I.N.S., 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (requiring this level of proof for deportation); Schneiderman
v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943) (same burden for denaturalization proceedings).
Finally, the INS was dissatisfied by the federal courts' refusal to permit use of a "viabil-
ity" standard to deny marital immigration benefits. In rejecting agency attempts to as-
certain whether an existing marriage was viable, the courts found that the only relevant
statutory issue was the subjective intent of the parties at the time of marriage. See, e.g.,
Alienating Sham Marriages, supra note 30, at 197-98.
41. Fraud Hearings, supra note 35, at 79-82 (statement of Jules E. Coven, President,
American Immigration Lawyers Association).
42. Id. at 24, 32 (statement of Vernon D. Penner, Jr.).
43. Id. at 12 (statement of Alan C. Nelson).
44. Id. at 13-17 (statement of Alan C. Nelson).
45. See, e.g., id. at 30 (statement of Vernon D. Penner, Jr.). Apparently it was the view
of many INS trial attorneys that successful denial of immigration benefits deriving from
a sham marriage under preexisting law was likely only when one of the parties to the
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reported by witnesses, therefore, presumably could have been ade-
quately addressed by pre-IMFA law.
46
In contrast, the discovery of bilateral marital fraud is unlikely to
occur without the commitment of investigative resources. Hearing
testimony suggested that INS data gathering and record mainte-
nance was inadequate to prevent such fraud.47 Furthermore, INS
managerial convenience in applying a "streamlined adjudication"
system to process marriage petitions resulted in a practice wherein
"files are not routinely consulted to verify allegations as to identity,
claims to status, and kinship." 48 The focus of the hearing, however,
was not to improve INS investigative resources or techniques, but to
obviate the need for enhancing proficiency by creating a conditional
status waiting period and reducing INS statutory burdens of proof.
A 1988 independent study of the INS's statistical methodology
casts considerable doubt on the accuracy of the agency's findings
concerning the incidence of immigration fraud.49 First, the study
points out that the INS did not use cases in which fraud was actually
demonstrated, but derived its estimates from the personal judg-
ments of investigators, formulated after preliminary investigation.
50
Second, the survey base was extremely small, comprising only one-
twentieth of one percent of the immigration petitions filed during
fiscal year 1984.51 Third, although purportedly a random sample,
the INS survey selectively excluded certain petition types, possibly
skewing the findings toward a higher suspected incidence of fraud.
52
Finally, if the fraud rate is as high as the Service asserts, then the
number of petitions denied by the agency should be much higher
than records indicate.
53
marriage was willing to testify as to the fraud. Remarks of F. Vandor, former INS Chi-
cago District Trial Attorney, 1988 Immigration Law Seminar, at the Indiana University
School of Law-Indianapolis.
46. Fraud Hearings, supra note 35, at 64-66 (statement of Roger L. Conner, Execu-
tive Director, Fed'n for Am. Immigration Reform).
47. See, e.g., id. at 70 (statement of Roger L. Conner).
48. Id. See also R. Steel, Steel on Immigration Law § 7:20 (1985) (describing a similar
expeditious agency procedure used to adjudicate adjustment of status applications).
49. INS Reveals Basis for Fraud Claims, 65 Interpreter Releases 26 (1988).
50. Id. at 27.
51. Id. For example, the INS examined only 42 cases, finding suspected-not
proven-fraud in 11 of these instances, to conclude that 26% of 33,000 labor certifica-
tions filed were fraudulent. Id.
52. INS investigators were prohibited from including five categories in the data base:
"spouses and children of principal beneficiaries, A or G nonimmigrants [representatives
of foreign governments], orphans, adopted children or refugees." Id.
53. INS Reveals Basis for Fraud Claims, supra note 49:
[E]xtrapolating from the small survey size of 360 cases to the universe of 675,000 1-
485, 1-140, and 1-130 applications projected at the time to be filed in Fiscal Year
1984, the report estimated that a total of over 200,000 suspected fraudulent peti-
tions might be filed that year. By contrast, the actual number of 1-485, 1-140 and I-
Yale Law & Policy Review
Congressional inclination to burden the immigration benefits af-
forded marital relationships cannot be entirely attributed to INS
fraud data, but also evinces a desire to counteract the historical pref-
erence of immigration law for family reunification. 54 The INS em-
pirical study, even if accurate, does not support many of the IMFA's
provisions. Although agency data show that occupational immigra-
tion was subject to similar levels of fraud,55 applicants admitted
under these categories were not restricted by the IMFA. In contrast,
the INS data did not cover many of the applicants actually regulated
by the IMFA. 56 Most remarkable, however, is that Congress enacted
the IMFA even though the questionable data it relied upon indi-
cated that seven out of ten married aliens were bona fide applicants.
It is also worthy of note that the IMFA's forcible banishment of
aliens marrying during the pendency of proceedings that contest
their right to remain in the country, the harshest provision of the
statute, was unsupported by any statistical evidence demonstrating
that these individuals are likely to engage in marital fraud.
Probably the most pernicious result of the INS survey was that it
drew attention away from the real needs of the immigration services.
These needs can likely be met only by more efficient utilization of
existing investigative capacities, an increase in administrative re-
sources to implement an effective fraud detection system, and a leg-
islative restructuring of the quota system to lessen the incentive for
fraud. Congress has instead implemented a system that permits the
INS to use time as a substitute for administrative effort-a technique
of questionable effectiveness. In the process, it sacrifices the assimi-
lative goals of the immigration laws by damaging the interests of
families seeking reunification.
2. The applicability and effect of the IMFA. The IMFA provides
that alien spouses, and the sons or daughters of citizens or perma-
nent residents, who acquire admission on the basis of any marriage
of less than two years duration occurring on or after November 10,
130 applications denied in FY [fiscal year] 1984 was only 28,299. This denial rate of
4.6 percent falls far below the survey's claim of a 30 percent fraud rate. While the
INS may lack the resources to investigate each filed application as thoroughly as it
might like for fraud, still one would expect the denied application rate to be much
higher if the amount of actual fraud is as great as the survey maintains.
54. See, e.g., Fraud Hearings, supra note 35, at 60 (statement of David S. North, Direc-
tor, Center For Labor and Migration Studies, New Transcentury Foundation).
55. INS Reveals Basis for Fraud Claims, supra note 49, at 27 (citing estimate by INS
that 26% of occupational immigration petitions were fraudulent).
56. Id. (indicating that the INS study did not review certain immigration petitions
filed on behalf of spouses and children).
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1986, will obtain permanent resident status on a two year condi-
tional basis. 57 The requirement is inapplicable to aliens whose mar-
riages are of more than two years duration before the acquisition of
immigration benefits 58 and does not apply equally to all familial re-
lationships of less than two years duration. 59
The juncture at which the two year conditional period begins is
not the inception of the marriage but the date of the applicant's ob-
taining conditional status. 60 Although the statute provides that con-
ditional immigrant status will exist for only two years, in practice
any qualifying marriage used for admission must endure longer.
Since the waiting period is not initiated until the conferral of condi-
tional status, existence of the marriage during the interval of visa
processing or adjudication is not considered in computing the two
year waiting period. Spouses of permanent residents may have to
remain married for almost four years due to the backlogged quota
system. 6' Immediate relatives, even though exempt from quota limi-
tations, will also have to maintain their marriages for more than two
years due to administrative delays in visa processing. 62 This situa-
tion provides a strong incentive for applicants to engage in strategic
maneuvering to evade conditional status by calculating the quota
57. INA § 216(a)(1), (g), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(l), (g) (Supp. IV 1986). See also INS
Rules on Effective Time of Marriage Fraud Law, 64 Interpreter Releases 593, 594
(1987).
58. INA § 216(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(g) (Supp. IV 1986).
59. For example, the statute exempts the alien spouses and stepchildren of third or
sixth occupational preference immigrants from conditional status. INA § 216(g), 8
U.S.C. § 1186a(g) (Supp. IV 1986). See Shapiro & McLoughlin, Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendments and the Proposed Regulations, in Immigration and Nationality Law,
42nd Anniversary Symposium of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, 2 Ad-
vanced Topics 27 (1988); The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (Part 2), 5
Immigr. L. Rep. 81, 85 (1986) [hereinafter IRCA of 1986 (Part 2)].
60. INA § 216(a)(1), (g), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(l), (g) (Supp. IV 1986). See also INS
Issues Further Instructions on Immigration Marriage Fraud Law, 63 Interpreter Re-
leases 1076, 1077-78 (1986) [hereinafter INS Instructions].
61. See, e.g., IRCA of 1986 (Part 2), supra note 59, at 86:
For example, if the spouse of a resident receives an immigrant visa at a U.S. consu-
late and is ready to be admitted to the United States 22 months after getting mar-
ried, admission to the United States at that point would result in two years of
conditional itatus. The marriage would effectively have to last 46 months before it
could be dissolved without fear of a removal of residence status.
In contrast, if the alien spouse took advantage of the four month visa validity period
and postponed her entry for two months, then she could avoid the two year probation-
ary period. Id.
62. The INS's increased workload since implementation of IRCA has lengthened the
approval period for immediate relatives to as much as nine months. See INS Central
Office Answers AILA Questions, 65 Interpreter Releases 28, 29, app. II at 42 (1988)
[hereinafter INS Central Office]. The INS attributes visa processing delays to the IRCA
legalization program and expects delays to end upon termination of that program. Id.
Under normal circumstances, citizen spouses are usually admitted within three months
of marriage. IRCA of 1986 (Part 2), supra note 59, at 85.
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backlogs, the time of the filing of entry request, and the interval re-
quired for administrative approval. For the knowledgeable second
preference applicant, avoidance of the probationary period is either
inherent in the quota system process or is a matter of a few months
inconvenience. Ironically, spouses of citizens lack recourse to simi-
lar stratagems to avoid conditional status. 63
The novelty of conditional immigrant status has provoked debate
focusing on formalistic arguments as to whether the IMFA simply
provides "permanent residency on a conditional basis" or instead
creates a "new status known as conditional permanent resident status." 64
The Act does provide that conditional status aliens have the same
naturalization eligibility as permanent residents. 65 Moreover, INS
regulations state that any conditional status holder possesses "all
the rights, privileges, responsibilities and duties as a lawful perma-
nent resident." 66 The proper interpretation of congressional intent
is apparently that, for matters not explicitly discussed in the statute,
conditional status holders have the same legal rights as permanent
residents. 67 This suggests that state law may not discriminate be-
tween conditional and permanent resident aliens. Nonetheless, ini-
tial confusion regarding the new status influenced some INS district
63. For second preference immigrants, calculated behavior to avoid the two year
probationary period is likely to become the rule rather than the exception. For example,
the State Department's estimation of the number of visas available for second prefer-
ence applicants in March 1988 provided the following waiting periods: for China, India,
and Korea, one year and six months; for the Dominican Republic, two years and four
months; for Mexico, ten years and one month; for the Philippines, six years and eight
months; for Hong Kong, four years and nine months; and for all other countries, one
year and seven months. 6 Bureau of Consular Affairs Visa Bulletin, Immigrant Numbers
for March 1988, at 2 (1988), reprinted in Immigration and Nationality Law, 42nd Anniver-
sary Symposium of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, 1 Fundamentals
130-33 (1988). Second preference spouses with a visa wait of approximately one and
one-half years may elude conditional status by strategically postponing visa application
or delaying entry. The two year probationary period is superfluous for aliens immigrat-
ing from extremely over-subscribed countries since they will be married more than two
years by the time of admission. Since citizens' spouses are exempt from the quota sys-
tem, and can usually be admitted within three months of marriage, evasion of condi-
tional status is unlikely. This result appears to be incongruous since there is no evidence
that citizens are more likely to enter into fraudulent marriages than resident aliens.
64. Comment, Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986: Till Congress Do
Us Part, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 1087, 1097-98 (1987) (emphasis in the original) [hereinaf-
ter Congress Do Us Part].
65. INA § 216(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(e) (Supp. IV 1986).
66. 53 Fed. Reg. 30,018 (1988) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 216.1); see also INS Cen-
tral Office, supra note 62, app. I at 34.
67. See, e.g., Congress Do Us Part, supra note 64, at 1098 & n.58 (citing 132 Cong.
Rec. 8588-89 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1986)) (quoting the statement of Rep. McCollum that
Congress "did not intend to create a new status of permanent residents").
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offices to advise state authorities otherwise. 68 Conditional status,
however, is not the statutory equivalent of permanent residence.
The IMFA distinguishes conditional status holders from permanent
residents in two important respects: it denies the former immigra-
tion benefits available to the latter, and it places them under severe
restrictions in conducting their private familial affairs.
The INS may terminate conditional resident status before the sec-
ond anniversary of a marriage upon the occurrence of any of three
statutorily defined circumstances. Two of the grounds for termina-
tion require INS findings that the marriage was a sham or that
money, other than attorney fees, was paid to procure entry. A third
ground for termination is provided where the marriage has been le-
gally terminated before the end of the two year period. 69 The first
two grounds for termination make no significant substantive change
to prior law, since the INS had statutory authority to terminate im-
migration benefits derived from demonstrably fraudulent relation-
ships prior to the IMFA's passage.70 The new enactments, however,
do substantially change the burden of proof borne by the INS. If
the alien chooses to contest the cancellation of conditional status, to
support termination the agency need only show one of the three
conditions by a preponderance of the evidence. 71 Upon removal of
the alien's conditional status, she will be subject to deportation
since adjustment to any other status is prohibited. 72 Previously the
INS had to provide "clear and convincing evidence" to support de-
portation; 73 thus, the IMFA simplifies the INS's task. Particularly
when the ground for cancellation is the legal termination of the
marriage, the agency's evidentiary burden can be satisfied by mere
presentation of the appropriate legal documentation.
For an alien to remove her conditional status, she and her spouse
must jointly petition the INS and present themselves for a personal
68. See, e.g., INS Central Office, supra note 62, app. I at 34 (citing the INS Central
Office's correction of an INS district director's improper interpretation that a condi-
tional permanent resident college student lacked the right to claim state residence tui-
tion available to permanent residents). See also Opinion and Letter Discuss Marriage
Fraud Amendments and Education, 65 Interpreter Releases 103, 104 (1988) (citing the
opinions of various state and federal agencies that conditional status holders have the
same eligibility as permanent residents for federal student financial assistance programs
and state resident tuition status).
69. INA § 216(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(l) (Supp. IV 1986).
70. See supra note 40.
71. INA § 216(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1986); see also INS Instruc-
tions, supra note 60, at 1079.
72. See INS Instructions, supra note 60, at 1079.
73. See, e.g., Patterson, Palmer & Brandes, IRCA, IMFA, and SDCEA: What does this
Immigration Alphabet Soup Spell?, 39 Baylor L. Rev. 413, 458 (1987) [hereinafter Al-
phabet Soup].
Yale Law & Policy Review
interview during the 90 day period immediately before the second
anniversary of the grant of conditional status.74 The requirement
that the petition must be jointly filed places the alien's immigration
status in a precarious position, dependent upon the good will of her
citizen or permanent resident spouse. In the event of domestic dis-
pute, the unscrupulous citizen or permanent resident spouse has a
legally superior strategic position to evoke concessions normally
unachievable by threat of divorce alone.
In the absence of ability to jointly file the petition, section
216(c)(4)(B) does offer a ground for forgiveness. To satisfy its stat-
utory prerequisites, however, the alien must show that "the qualify-
ing marriage was entered into in good faith by the alien spouse, but
. . . has been terminated (other than through the death of the
spouse) by the alien spouse for good cause and the alien was not at
fault." 75 The statute fails to define or provide examples of "good
cause" or "fault." Since many state divorce laws have moved to-
ward a "no fault" model of divorce, problems of proof are likely.
Applying the immigration laws in a manner that conflicts with the
development of domestic family law may also prove administratively
burdensome. Immigration judges may be presented with the oner-
ous task of "untangling the history of the marriage" and delegating
fault in a "mud-slinging" proceeding.76 Furthermore, when divorce
has been sought, the waiver is available only if the alien spouse files.
Given the deleterious consequences to the alien's immigration sta-
tus should her spouse file for divorce, the statute may encourage a
"race to the courthouse," and discourage attempts to resolve mari-
tal difficulties. As a consequence, it is inconsistent with "society's
long-standing tradition of encouraging, revering, and protecting
marriage as an institution. ' 77
The statute alternatively provides that the conditional status alien
may obtain a waiver of the joint filing requirement upon a showing
that "extreme hardship" would result if she was deported. 78 The
IMFA does not define "extreme hardship," but the phrase is a term
of art appearing in other INA provisions such as the suspension of
deportation statute. 79 Although determination of extreme hardship
74. INA § 216(c)(1)(A), (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(l)(A), (B) (Supp. IV 1986); INA
§ 216(d)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(d)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
75. INA § 216(c)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1986).
76. Ingber & Prischet, supra note 33, at 564-65.
77. Id. at 565.
78. INA § 216(c)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
79. The term "extreme hardship" is used in the INA's suspension of deportation
statute and its waivers of exclusion for certain criminal offenses. INA §§ 212(h),
244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(h), 1254(a)(1). See Waivers of Excludability Under Sections
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is clearly committed to the discretion of the INS,80 derivation of a
settled meaning for the term has proven to be elusive. Two factors
account for this ambiguity. First, Congress failed to provide ade-
quate interpretive guidance in the form of legislative history. 8' Sec-
ond, determination of "extreme hardship" defies easy adjudication
since it is a "mixed question of law and fact." 8 2 Mere economic in-
jury associated with deportation is insufficient; the alien must usu-
ally demonstrate a complete lack of economic opportunity in her
country of origin before extreme hardship will be conceded.
8 3
Demonstrating that deportation may preclude the alien from ob-
taining employment comparable to the position she holds in the
United States is also inadequate, as is the concomitant separation of
family members.8 4 Aliens in successful suspension cases usually ex-
hibit an extraordinary combination of factors including: parental
separation from young children; an effort to avoid displacement of
youthful minors to the alien parent's native country where language
barriers and different traditions would present major obstacles to
the child's development; and a showing that the parent's severe loss
of earning capacity would be detrimental to the child.85 A signifi-
cant loss of earning capacity associated with the need to provide a
sick child medical treatment, which the country of deportation lacks,
has likewise been deemed to constitute adequate hardship.
8 6
Several factors suggest that the IMFA's hardship waiver will not
provide effective relief. First, an adverse INS waiver decision would
be difficult to overturn on judicial review, since abuse of discretion
is a limited standard of review resulting in agency affirmance in the
majority of cases. Second, the INS is likely to find extreme hardship
only in the exceptional instance where a combination of factors
present an overwhelmingly sympathetic case. Finally, the IMFA
hardship waiver may be even more difficult to obtain than the waiver
for suspension of deportation proceedings. In determining extreme
hardship under the IMFA, the "Attorney General shall consider
circumstances occurring only during the period that the alien was
212(h) and (i) of the Act, 1 Immigr. L. Rep. 33, 37 (1981); Suspension of Deportation, 1
Immigr. L. Rep. 41 (1981) [hereinafter Suspension of Deportation].
80. I.N.S. v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 (1981) (per curiam).
81. Feldman, Scope of Judicial Review: Extreme Hardship and the Whipsaw of Ille-
gal Aliens, 36 Admin. L. Rev. 27, 32 (1984).
82. See id. at 30.
83. Prapavat v. I.N.S., 638 F.2d 87, 89 (9th Cir. 1981).
84. Matter of Sangster, 11 I. & N. Dec. 309 (BIA 1965).
85. See, e.g., Suspension of Deportation, supra note 79, at 45 (citing Prapavat v.
I.N.S., 638 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1981); Bastidas v. I.N.S., 609 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1979)).
86. See Suspension of Deportation, supra note 79, at 45.
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admitted for permanent residence on a conditional basis."8 7 Since
the apparent effect of this provision is to render the interests of chil-
dren born before the grant of conditional status irrelevant, one of
the more effective grounds for claiming hardship has been elimi-
nated. For these reasons, the IMFA extreme hardship waiver will
likely prove ineffectual as an ameliorative device in the majority of
cases. To the extent that Congress intended to devalue assimilative
interests and limit the waiver to extraordinary circumstances, the
statute is effective.
The effects of the IMFA remain even after the successful termina-
tion of probationary status and grant of permanent residence. Sec-
tion 204(a)(2)88 limits the ability of aliens to remarry within five
years of the grant of permanent residence except in the event of the
former spouse's death. This bar against remarriage is clearly in-
tended to deter "sham divorce." In a sham divorce, an alien di-
vorces her alien spouse, fully intending to remarry him, and
immigrates on the basis of marriage to a citizen or permanent resi-
dent. Marriage to a former boyfriend after divorce is statutorily
fraudulent if the alien did not intend to maintain the immigrating
marriage. Section 204(a)(2) therefore prohibits the grant of second
preference status to a former conditional status holder's new spouse
unless the alien can establish by "clear and convincing evidence"
that her prior marriage "was not entered into for the purpose" of
circumventing the immigration laws.
The statute is inartfully drafted if its purpose is to discourage the
occurrence of sham divorces. In most cases the provision will not
apply if the alien immigrated on the basis of marriage to a citizen,
because the alien spouse will be eligible for naturalization within
three years.8 9 As a citizen she then can enable her new spouse to
immigrate as an "immediate relative" rather than under a second
preference category. Spouses who are entitled to immigrate be-
cause of marriage to occupational immigrants are exempt from the
restriction since second preference spouses are the only quota im-
migrants under the statutory impediment. 90 Likewise, the statute is
ineffectual if the former spouse or boyfriend has, or can acquire,
permanent residence on an independent basis. After divorce and
remarriage, the new spouse will not need the alien's assistance to
acquire admission. Incentive to fraudulently marry a citizen to gain
speedier immigration, however, is not lessened in this circumstance.
87. INA § 216(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) (Supp. IV 1986).
88. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
89. See supra note 12.
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986) (last sentence of the section).
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The IMFA therefore applies the statutory burden to a very limited
class of individuals, while exempting the majority who have similar
incentives to engage in fraud. The provision is also troublesome
due to its requirement that the alien satisfy the "clear and convinc-
ing" burden of proof standard to enable her new spouse to immi-
grate. Since the five year bar on remarriage is in addition to the two
year conditional status, the statute's extended applicability may be
an additional cause for concern since even good faith marriages
might falter during this seven year period.
If litigation is a valid indicator,9' the IMFA's most controversial
provision is its prohibition of adjustment of status to any alien who
seeks that benefit based on a marriage entered into during the pen-
dency of judicial or administrative proceedings contesting her right
to remain in the United States.92 The law provides that any alien
who marries under these circumstances may not adjust status "until
the alien has resided outside the United States for a two-year period
beginning after the date of the marriage."93 The validity of the mar-
riage relationship is irrelevant-the test is the mere pendency of ex-
pulsion proceedings. As a consequence, the couple is denied any
opportunity to demonstrate the legitimacy of their relationship.
The IMFA irrebuttably presumes that-people who marry during the
pendency of expulsion proceedings do so for fraudulent purposes.
Because the expulsion process can span years, it is likely that the
statutory presumption is overinclusive and may actually discourage
aliens from exercising their legal right to contest deportation.
94
Avoiding the statutory mandate by departing the country, travel-
ing overseas to marry, and then applying for readmission is not
without cost. This process is particularly onerous for spouses of cit-
izens, who would otherwise have the right to immediately adjust sta-
tus and begin married life in the United States. The oppressive
91. For citation of the cases filed contesting the constitutionality of these IMFA pro-
visions, see supra note 8.
92. INA § 245(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(e) (Supp. IV 1986).
93. INA § 204(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(h) (Supp. IV 1986).
94. The limited number of immigration judges contributes to significant delays in
hearing deportation cases, and appeals to the BIA can take years. Even if the alien is
successful at the administrative level, the government may further delay the acquisition
of immigration benefits by seeking judicial review. If the alien is unsuccessful, however,
she must still comply with the two year foreign residence requirement. As a conse-
quence, aliens contesting deportation are penalized significantly. They would obtain
lawful status more quickly by not contesting the deportation charges, even if the charges
were inaccurate, departing the country voluntarily and reentering after acquisition of
conditional status through marriage. See, e.g., Frye, Through the Looking Glass Darkly-
Section 5 of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments, 11 Immigr. J. 1, 8
(Jan./Mar. 1986) (arguing that the IMFA's penalization of the right to challenge depor-
tation is unconstitutional) [hereinafter Through the Looking Glass].
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consequences of these provisions apply to any affected couple, how-
ever. Lack of financial resources, foreign licensure and residency
requirements, illness, or occupational duties may make evasion of
the statute arduous. 95 Moreover, the most significant risk of this eva-
sion strategy may be the fact that judicial review of consular visa
denial is not available.
9 6
B. IRCA Amendment of the Adjustment of Status Statute
IRCA's amendment of the adjustment of status program extends
the contemporary nonassimilative trend of the immigration laws be-
yond marital restrictions. Prior to IRCA, adjustment lessened the
incidence of family separation by permitting aliens eligible for per-
manent residence to acquire this benefit within the United States.
In addition, adjustment served a humanitarian function by ex-
tending relief from deportation to aliens having certain family rela-
tionships. Many aliens are now denied these advantages under the
amended adjustment of status statute. The nonassimilative effect of
the new statutory restrictions has been exacerbated by the State De-
partment's termination of its stateside criteria program. Stateside
criteria, a program that allowed aliens closely related to permanent
residents or citizens to apply for permanent residence in Mexico or
Canada, greatly diminished the severity of adjustment disqualifica-
tion. 97 Like the IMFA, IRCA's modification of the adjustment pro-
gram is emotionally and economically burdensome to family
relationships but does not effectively prevent fraud.
1. History and operation of the adjustment of status program. The
Immigration Act of 1924 did not permit an alien present in the
United States, and otherwise eligible for permanent residence, to
acquire permanent status without leaving the country to receive a
visa from a consular officer.98 In effect, the alien was required to
leave the country in order to return. This illogical requirement did
not escape the notice of either the immigration bureaucracy or in-
terested aliens. Not only did the practice cause monetary and emo-
tional hardship for the alien and her family, but it generated
unnecessary paper work and delay for the agencies involved. One
95. Id. at 7.
96. See infra note 109.
97. See Immigration Primer, supra note 1, at 74.
98. Foster, The Logic of Adjustment of Status to Permanent Residency, 24 S. Tex.
L.J. 37 (1983) [hereinafter Logic of Adjustment]. For another explanation of the history
of, purposes of, and qualifications for adjustment of status, see Comment, Adjustment
of Status Under Section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 20 San Diego L.
Rev. 165 (1982) [hereinafter Adjustment].
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former INS general counsel has described the process as "exceed-
ingly cumbersome and ... the greatest paper shuffle in the history
of the U.S. immigration system." 99
Due to the problems caused by this requirement, the INS created
the pre-examination program in the 1930s. This program permit-
ted adjustment applicants to apply for the benefit in Canada rather
than returning to their country of origin. 100 President Truman's
1952 Commission on Immigration characterized the requirement
that the alien make a trip abroad solely for the purpose of acquiring
a visa as "an expensive procedure which served no useful purpose
either for the alien or for the United States."''1 1 The Commission
accordingly approved the administrative practice of pre-examina-
tion, finding that it "did not eliminate the usual checks and proce-
dures in issuing visas. . . [and] [n]o persuasive evidence seems to
have been presented to justify a contrary view."' 0 2
Congress nevertheless disapproved of the pre-examination pro-
cess, asserting "that the preexamination program was cumbersome,
obsolete, and, as practiced, contained certain loopholes for the ad-
mission for permanent residence of undesirable aliens," and implic-
itly directed that it be abolished. 10 3 In 1952, however, Congress
enacted section 245 to provide a statutory device for change of sta-
tus. Unfortunately, the provision had several restrictions that hin-
dered its effectiveness. Major limitations of the 1952 Act included
the requirement that the applicant maintain lawful nonimmigrant
status to apply for adjustment, and the fact that the filing of the ap-
plication terminated nonimmigrant status. 10 4 Furthermore, Con-
gress withheld the Act's benefits from natives of western
hemisphere countries, and excluded spouses or children of citizens
unless they had been in the country for at least one year before ac-
quiring eligibility. 0 5 The Truman Commission severely criticized
the statute and recommended the adoption of expansive amend-
ments to restore the beneficial features of pre-examination. 0 6
99. Nonimmigrant Business Visas and Adjustment of Status: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 85, 87 (1981) (statement of Sam Bernsen).
100. Logic of Adjustment, supra note 98, at 37.
101. President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, Report (1953), re-
printed as Whom We Shall Welcome 209 (1971) [hereinafter Truman Commission].
102. Id.
103. H.R. Rep. No. 2096, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1952); see also 2 C. Gordon & H.
Rosenfield, supra note 1, at § 7.3a.
104. See, e.g., 2 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield , supra note 1, at § 7.7a.
105. Id.
106. Truman Commission, supra note 101, at 210-11.
Yale Law & Policy Review
Due to the inadequacy of section 245, and the limited number of
aliens that could qualify under its restrictive provisions, the INS re-
vived the practice of pre-examination despite the lack of congres-
sional authorization.' 0 7 Subsequent congressional amendments
from 1957 to 1976, however, removed most of the restrictive provi-
sions of the 1952 statute, and were intended both to avoid the filing
of numerous private bills to ameliorate hardship in individual cases
and to enlarge the number of aliens who could adjust their status
within the country. s08 The single most important amendment was
the elimination of noneligibility for aliens whose status had become
irregular.
After the INA of 1952 was enacted, adjustment of status under
section 245 gradually evolved into an effective tool for aliens in the
United States who had both the desire and legal basis to become
lawful permanent residents. Adjusting status in the United States is
superior to applying for a visa overseas in several ways: pragmatic
advantages in time and expense to both the alien applicant and the
government; less stringent documentation requirements; a gener-
ally faster processing time; and the retention of the right to judicial
review should the adjustment be denied.' 0 9 Pre-examination was
revived under the guise of the stateside criteria program."
t 0
2. Analysis of the new adjustment of status provision. IRCA's
amendment of section 245 is a poorly drafted provision"' which
represents a regression in the assimilative evolution of the immigra-
tion laws. Prior to the IRCA, section 245 was the primary means by
which aliens already present in the United States acquired perma-
nent residence and sought elimination of technical problems with
107. 20 Fed. Reg. 3,496 (1955) (amending 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.61, 245.54).
108. 2 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 1, at § 7.7a.
109. See generally Immigration Process & Policy, supra note 13, at 484-85. See also 2 C.
Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 1, at § 7.7a. Under current law, a consular officer's
denial of a visa is not subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Centeno v. Shultz, 817 F.2d
1212 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 696 (1988). This view has been severely
criticized. See, e.g., Bernsen, Consular Absolutism in Visa Cases, 63 Interpreter Releases
388 (1986); Gotcher, Review of Consular Visa Determinations, 60 Interpreter Releases
247 (1983); Note, A Case For Judicial Review of Consular Visa Decisions, 22 Stan. J.
Int'l L. 363 (1986).
110. See Logic of Adjustment, supra note 98, at 38.
111. For a discussion of the drafting errors in section 245, see Rubin, Section 245 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act as Amended by the Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act of 1986 and the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, in The New
Simpson-Rodino Immigration Law of 1986, at 518-19 (1986); Bender's Immigration and
Nationality Act Pamphlet 144 n.28 (B. Chase & J. Rintoul ed. 1987).
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their immigration status. Leading immigration law sources com-
monly describe the adjustment provision as "relief from deporta-
tion" 'or "regularization of status, ' l 12 but the IRCA has rendered
these designations anachronistic since section 245 no longer either
offers relief from deportation or regularizes the status of many
aliens. This severity comports with congressional intent not only to
restrict the availability of the relief, but also to encourage the elimi-
nation of the stateside criteria program.' 
3
IRCA's most significant change to the adjustment of status pro-
cess is the amendment of section 245(c)(2) to prohibit the adjust-
ment to permanent resident of any non-immediate relative alien
''not in legal immigration status on the date of filing the application
for adjustment of status or who has failed (other than through no
fault of his own for technical reasons) to maintain continuously a
legal status since entry into the United States."' 14 This section re-
flects congressional desire to reinstate the 1952 version of section
245, which required that the applicant possess a lawful nonimmi-
grant status in order to become a permanent resident. Failure to
.maintain immigration status now disqualifies an alien from adjusting
status in the United States, and requires that she proceed overseas
to acquire a visa from a State Department consulate officer. Pursu-
ant to BIA interpretation, the provision does not apply to any alien
whose adjustment application was filed prior to November 6, 1986,
the date of the statute's passage." 5 The limitation is likewise inap-
plicable to the spouses of citizens because they are immediate rela-
tives. Contrary to the erroneous opinion of some commentators,
perhaps due to a failure to fully comprehend the complex interrela-
tion of section 245 to other INA provisions, this preferential treat-
ment does not permit immediate relatives to avoid the harsh effects
of the IMFA.
l 16
112. See, e.g., 2 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 1, at ch. 7 (discussing adjust-
ment of status in chapter entitled "Relief from Deportation"); Immigration Process &
Policy, supra note 13, at ch. 6, § C (similar discussion under "Regularization of Status").
113. S. Rep. No. 1200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 2, at 31 (1985).
114. INA § 245(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
115. Matter of Battista, I.D. No. 3036 (BIA Oct. 21, 1987).
116. See Alphabet Soup, supra note 73, at 463:
To avoid ... [the section 204(h)] two-year foreign residence requirement, the alien
need merely await the conclusion of the deportation or exclusion proceedings, leave
the United States to marry, and then gain immigration benefits. Granted, the alien
must take a short vacation, but can confidently return prior to issuance of a visa as
the INA [section 245] excuses . . . lack of status for an immediate relative.
The above assertion is an overstatement for several reasons. First, it would be unwise to
"await the conclusion" of an exclusion or deportation hearing since the execution of a
successful expulsion order constitutes an independent basis for barring future readmis-
sion. INA § 212(a)(16), (17), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(16), (17) (Supp. IV 1986); INA
§ 241(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). The astute practice is to avoid this
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3. The stateside criteria program. After adoption of the section
245 amendments, the State Department initially attempted to use
stateside criteria to lessen the law's severity. The State Depart-
ment's first position was that only aliens ineligible to adjust solely by
reason of the amended version of section 245 were disqualified from
the stateside criteria program. t t 7 If the alien, however, was also in-
eligible because of another INA provision, then the applicant could
seek stateside criteria. Despite its desirability as a device for "sub-
verting" draconian legislative intent, this interpretation was suspect
because the distinction appeared to have no valid interpretive or
moral basis. It would, in effect, provide an incentive for an alien to
place herself in violation of some other provision of the INA to qual-
ify for stateside processing. This would constitute a calculated risk
since the alien must presume, perhaps falsely, that she can success-
fully procure a statutory waiver of the additional deficiency.
After reconsideration, the State Department changed its position
and announced its intention to totally eliminate the stateside criteria
program as of December 31, 1987.1s8 Although the State Depart-
ment explained that the program was "not a regulatory one and
[was] based solely upon administrative decisions,""t 9 a degree of
skepticism may be justified before accepting this as the primary rea-
son for the program's termination. First, the program had been
subject to legislative disfavor since 1952, but was continued on
grounds both of applicant hardship and of administrative conven-
ience. It is noteworthy that Congress expressed displeasure with
the program in IRCA's legislative history, while not expressly
prohibiting its operation by statute. Second, recitation of factors of
administrative convenience dominate the State Department notice,
and may be the primary motivation for terminating the program.
The State Department stated that it needed to reallocate its re-
sources "to carry out the Department's requirements under
IRCA."' 20 It is possible that some form of stateside criteria may be
reinstituted once the pressures of the IRCA legalization program
have terminated.
occurrence through voluntary departure. Second, the advice evinces a failure to analyze
section 245 in its entirety. Although section 245(c) does exempt immediate relative
aliens from the continuous maintenance of legal status requirement, it does not excuse
surreptitious entry without visa. Section 245(a) qualifies section 245(c) by limiting ad-
justment of status to aliens who were "admitted or paroled into the United States." INA
§ 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
117. See Wire of INS Commissioner Alan C. Nelson to INS Field Offices (Jan. 14,
1987), reprinted in 64 Interpreter Releases 152, 153 (1987).
118. 52 Fed. Reg. 45,272 (1987).
119. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,442 (1987).
120. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,443 (1987).
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The State Department's exercise of managerial authority in this
matter probably does not constitute an abuse of discretion in the
legal sense of that term.' 2 ' The State Department indicated that the
stateside criteria program must be given a lower priority than the
Department's statutory requirements under IRCA and "other high
priority needs."' 122 On policy grounds, however, the rationale for
this reallocation is suspect. First, the policy gives insufficient weight
to the fact that most aliens subject to a disqualifying deficiency
under section 245 will seek admission on the basis of a family rela-
tionship. The emotional and economic reliance often present in
these relationships, and the alien's existing attachment to and in-
volvement in the community, at least raise doubt as to whether non-
immigrant aliens abroad and others dealing with the State
Department should receive priority treatment in this context. Sec-
ond, not all countries have visa-issuing posts. In this situation, the
State Department has stated that it would take this factor under con-
sideration as a "hardship."'' 23 State Department consideration,
however, apparently does not encompass the injury accruing to ad-
justment applicants who may find it arduous to return to their coun-
tries of origin because of personal reasons, time, or expense. Third,
the majority of aliens having irregular status originate from particu-
lar nations. The reallocation of stateside criteria cases will "certainly
impact those posts in countries with already high numbers of immi-
grant visa applicants, such as Mexico, the Philippines, Haiti, the Do-
minican Republic and Jamaica."' 124 Finally, it is not obvious that
elimination of the stateside criteria program will serve the end of
administrative convenience. Neither the State Department nor the
INS has adequately explained why two of the program's primary at-
tributes-the avoidance of unnecessary paperwork and conservation
of agency time-are no longer desirable.
C. Commentary on the IMFA and the IRCA Adjustment of Status
It would be misleading to view the IMFA and the IRCA adjust-
ment of status provisions as mere fraud prevention devices. If the
deterrence of fraud was Congress's primary objective in passing the.
IMFA, then the statute's exemption of the spouses and children of
121. See generally Fletcher, Some Unwise Reflections About Discretion, 47 Law &
Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1984, at 269, 280 (indicating that a "decision to allocate re-
sources represents an exercise of managerial discretion").
122. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,443 (1987).
123. 52 Fed. Reg. 45,272, 45,273 (1987).
124. 64 Interpreter Releases 1337 (1987).
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occupational aliens is inexplicable. The Act's treatment of condi-
tional status aliens whose marriages do not survive the two year pe-
riod is also incongruous since occupational aliens are not required
to retain employment for a set period of time and may remain even
without having worked at all or having worked briefly and subse-
quently terminated employment, absent a showing of fraud. 125
When viewed as a precursor of the Kennedy-Simpson Bill, the pref-
erential treatment of "talented" immigrants by the IMFA exhibits a
certain rationality and could be understood as a desire to redress
the historical dominance of family relationships under the immigra-
tion laws. The statute could be restructured, however, to more eq-
uitably effectuate the latter purpose.. The IMFA regulates the
incidence rather than the causes of marriage fraud by. neglecting
quota system reforms that would alleviate such fraud. The Ken-
nedy-Simpson Bill offers some relief by broadening opportunities to
immigrate on other grounds but underestimates the degree to
which powerful pressures for fraud stem from the forcible separa-
tion of families. Future immigration legislation should do more
than is currently proposed to ease the backlog of first preference
immigration.
The IMFA's capability to prevent fraud is questionable. First, indi-
viduals sufficiently determined to enter the country can successfully
maintain the appearance of a valid marital relationship for two years
without great inconvenience. Although the statute mandates that at
the end of the period the petitioning couple must present itself to
the INS for an interview, the INS will probably waive this require-
ment in most instances unless it has some specific reason to suspect
marriage fraud.1 26 Second, given that the IMFA does not improve
the inadequate investigative capability of the INS to discover fraud,
substituting the passage of time for administrative effort is unlikely
to prove effective. Only individuals ignorant of-the law will marry
during expulsion proceedings. To permit them at least the opportu-
nity to demonstrate marital legitimacy does not appear too great a
concession to relational interests. The resulting administrative
costs are not excessive since the marital validity hearing could be
part of an ongoing proceeding and patterned after the existing
125. See Jang Man Cho v. I.N.S., 669 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1982) (alien not reporting
for work permitted to retain permanent resident status absent a showing of a lack of
intent to accept the position upon entry); Matter of Marcoux, 12 I. & N. Dec. 827 (BIA
1968) (alien dissatisfied with employment who left after five days allowed to remain
since there was no evidence of fraudulent intent to gain other employment).
126. New INS Operations Instructions on Transferees and Students; Proposed Mar-
riage Fraud Regulations, 7 Immigr. L. Rep. 13, 24 (1988).
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waiver for failure to file a joint petition. 2 7 Finally, implementation
of a statutory design contrary to the policies of United States family
law is incompatible with the interests of administrative efficiency.
As with the IMFA, the key to understanding legislative dissatisfac-
tion with pre-IRCA adjustment is awareness of Congress's sense
that the provision promoted fraud.' 28 Under the adjustment pro-
gram, any alien who had acquired a nonimmigrant visa with a
"preconceived intent" to immigrate had circumvented the statutory
scheme and could be denied adjustment.129 Although IRCA's legis-
lative history does not reveal this concern, Congress believed, ap-
parently without statistical basis, that the increasing number of
adjustments indicated the proliferation of fraud. There are two pos-
sible explanations for the paucity of legislative history in this re-
spect. First, given the extensive consideration accorded such
amendments over the years-as substantively similar bills were rein-
troduced130-Congress may have found further debate unnecessary.
Alternatively, because much of the prior debate was injurious to the
amendments' enactment, entering similar testimony into the record
might have proven embarrassing.
Prior adjustment of status studies and recommendations'advised
against diminishing the statute's assimilative benefits and concluded
that the proposed amendment would increase fraud rather than pro-
tect the integrity of the visa system. The Select Committee's 1981
Final Report, like the Truman Commission report, recommended
that the statute remain in its pre-IRCA form since there was no de-
monstrable evidence of substantial abuse.' 3 ' The State Department
testified in congressional hearings that the proposed amendment
was impractical because it did not disqualify applicants from immi-
gration benefits, but merely required a pointless trip to a consular
127. Marriage Fraud Amendments Regulations, 53 Fed. Reg. 30,011, 30,020-21 (to
be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 216.5) (providing that a waiver for good cause may be based on
commingling of assets, length of cohabitation after marriage, or other pertinent
evidence).
128. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 1653, 1718.
129. See, e.g., Adjustment, supra note 98, at 175-79.
130. See, e.g., S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 5872, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982). Similar legislation was introduced in several successive congressional sessions.
See Immigration Reform History, supra note 22, at 31-34; Griffith, Reforming the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act: Labor Certification, Adjustment of Status, the Reach of De-
portation, and Entry by Fraud, 17 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 265 (1984).
131. SCIRP, supra note 15, at 205.
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post. 13 2 Other immigration experts criticized the measure as "un-
humanitarian," an impediment to international trade and com-
merce, and an unnecessary administrative burden. 33  The
preexisting section 245 promoted the acquisition of legal status by
providing a relatively simple adjustment procedure to aliens statuto-
rily qualified for permanent residence. The new restrictions, how-
ever, may encourage aliens to maintain illegal status to avoid family
separation and the burden of returning abroad to apply.' 3 4 It is par-
ticularly ironic that the legislation will effectively penalize aliens who
enter the country in good faith, but will probably not significantly
deter those entering the country with preconceived intent to commit
fraud. 13 5  If the IRCA's amendment of section 245 was designed
to prevent fraud, then it is an ineffective, symbolic gesture unneces-
sarily burdensome to potential immigrants and to the immigration
system. A broader look at the legislation shows that it facilitates
Congress's shift of emphasis in immigration law away from domina-
tion by concerns of family reunification. The revision of the adjust-
ment process is of even greater utility than the IMFA in this cause,
as it encompasses any alien in the country who seeks permanent res-
idence. The restriction of the adjustment program, like the IMFA's
adoption, signals more than congressional concern with fraud pre-
vention or a historical regression to the 1952 version of the INA.
The new adjustment of status provision is also a precursor of Ken-
nedy-Simpson's realignment of immigration policy.
The IMFA and IRCA adjustment of status laws exhibit an appall-
ing attempt to conserve administrative resources at the cost of
"human capital." Administrative convenience also underlies the
disparate responses of the immigration agencies to the adoption of
these laws. The State Department, fearful of diverting scarce re-
sources to unnecessary labor-intensive tasks, opposed adoption of
the legislation. The INS's support for the new enactments was mo-
tivated by a desire to avoid burdensome fraud investigations.' 36
132. Immigration Reform and Control Act: Hearings on S. 529 Before the Sub-
comm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 456, 461 (1983) (prepared statement of Diego C. Asencio, Assistant
Secretary for Consular Affairs, Dep't of State).
133. Id. at 102-05.
134. See Nonimmigrant Business Visas and Adjustment of Status: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 92, 106 (1981) (prepared statement of Charles Foster, President,
Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass'n).
135. See Adjustment, supra note 98, at 184.
136. Cf Alienating Sham Marriages, supra note 30, at 188-90 (describing INS re-
source deficiencies preventing effective use of investigation to discover sham marriages).
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Post-IMFA INS rulemaking has instituted further resource savings
through questionable statutory interpretations that increase the
laws' severity. 137 The next section demonstrates why these statutes
and administrative rules lack efficiency or optimal rule-precision.
III. A Theory of Effective Immigration Administration
One of the main principles of any immigration reform effort is
that immigration law "should be enforced, and therefore enforcea-
ble." 38 To obey this admonition, policymakers and administrators
must continually rectify past errors and enhance program effi-
ciency.' 3 9 Congress's enactment of the IMFA, and its adjustment of
status amendments, however, are signs that concern about enforce-
ability had not been fully integrated into the legislative framework.
At the same time, the immigration agencies have done little to com-
pensate for, or to ameliorate, legislative inadequacies. The princi-
pal reasons for these failures are harsh, unrealistic policies,
137. In proposed rulemaking, the INS broadly interpreted the phrase "[pending]
administrative.., proceedings... regarding the alien's right to enter or remain" to apply
the IMFA's two year exile to rescission of adjustment of s tatus proceedings. Marriage
Fraud Amendment Regulations, 53 Fed. Reg. 2,426, 2,427 (1988). The INS retreated
from this position after it was disputed by the BIA and by adverse rulemaking com-
ments. See Recent Decision, 65 Interpreter Releases 383, 384 (1988); Marriage Fraud
Amendment Regulations, 53 Fed. Reg. 30,011, 30,013 (1988). The INS regulations
could apparently be construed to apply the banishment provision even if the proceed-
ings are terminated in favor of the alien. See Proposed Marriage Fraud Amendment Reg-
ulations Published, 65 Interpreter Releases, 97, 98 (1988). The construction might
arguably comport with congressional intent if it is assumed that a subsequent favorable
judicial or administrative decision is irrelevant to the alien's fraudulent intent. The INS
interpretation, however, also encompasses aliens who decline to delay their marital
plans, believing they have lawful status. Particularly when the alien's view is affirmed,
applying the two year exile would appear to violate fundamental principles of fairness.
The INS's view that the statutory banishment period is applicable to "any alien who
marries between the date of the issuance of the order to show cause [against deporta-
tion] and the date of the alien's departure from the U.S." is probably consistent with
Congress's restrictive purpose. INS Interprets Marriage Fraud Law, 64 Interpreter Re-
leases 1097 (1987) (citing INS letter to Mr. Alan Lee, May 18, 1987). The INS position
that an alien may not file a visa petition during the two year exile, however, is more
questionable. 53 Fed. Reg. 30,011-13. Although this construction would be of little
consequence to immediate relatives, it would greatly delay the already lengthy admis-
sion of second preference spouses by tacking the IMFA's two year interval onto their
lengthy admission wait. Nothing in the statute expressly forbids applicants abroad from
filing an immigrant petition to concurrently satisfy the IMFA's foreign residency re-
quirement and the INA's visa waiting period. The INS interpretation is also inconsistent
with the favorable visa treatment the INS has extended to certain occupational immi-
grants. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(a) (1988). Finally, INS regulations failed to clarify vague
statutory terminology such as "good cause," "fault," "extreme hardship," or indicate
the IMFA's effect on preexisting INA fraud waivers.
138. Whelan, Immigration Principles of U.S. Immigration Policy, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
447, 455 (1983).
139. See SCIRP, supra note 15, at 233.
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inadequate resources for immigration services, and disarray of the
immigration bureaucracy. The immigration bureaucracy's refusal to
leave the boundary of mainstream administrative law, along with the
judiciary's deference to this choice, has exacerbated the problem by
hindering the development of effective decisionmaking techniques.
In addition, application of regulatory theory suggests that the IMFA
and the adjustment of status provisions are suboptimal laws lacking
precision. This section contends that rational, realistic, and equita-
ble statutes are necessary requirements for effective administration.
A. Harsh Laws, Inadequate Resources, and Ineffective Reform
The immigration bureaucracy's implementation of the immigra-
tion laws has been the subject of extensive study and criticism. 140
Neither the INS nor the State Department, however, is solely ac-
countable for the ineffectual implementation of immigration laws.
Congress is a major, perhaps primary, source of the bureaucratic
dilemma. One Attorney General, the cabinet officer in charge of the
INS, has testified that the immigration statutes have sought to im-
plement "unrealistic policies" and that the INS has "failed to en-
force our laws effectively."'14 Although any national regulatory
program has its critics, it is unusual for the head of the office
charged with that program's oversight to be one of them.
A key factor contributing to the immigration bureaucracy's ad-
ministrative difficulties is Congress's historical practice of enacting
unnecessarily harsh immigration legislation. Many of the INA's ex-
clusionary provisions are anachronistic and redundant. 142 Congress
has largely ignored even those recommended reforms that, while
faithful to the INA's substantive purposes, could ease administrative
140. See, e.g., M. Morris, Immigration-The Beleaguered Bureaucracy (1985); U.S.
Comm'n on Civil Rights, The Tarnished Golden Door: Civil Rights Issues in Immigra-
tion (1980) [hereinafter Civil Rights]. Immigration reform has for years been a particu-
larly popular subject of both congressional and executive studies. For a noninclusive
sampling of such reports, see History of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 81-82 (Comm. Print 1980) (pre-
pared by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, for the Select Com-
mission on Immigration and Refugee Policy).
141. Administration's Proposals on Immigration and Refugee Policy: Joint Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, and the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1981) (testimony of Att'y Gen.
William French Smith).
142. See SCIRP, supra note 15, at 282-83 (urging Congress to reconsider the INA
exclusionary grounds, some inaugurated in 1875, many of which now seem "archaic").
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burdens by permitting recognition of legitimate assimilative inter-
ests.143 Statutory improvements could be instituted without renova-
tion of substantive admission criteria or reconsideration of the
quota system. 144 More radical improvements would require recon-
sideration of several substantive provisions in the current law that
are unduly severe and difficult to administer in their present
form. 145  The INA is a complex and poorly drafted law. 146 Proba-
bly comparable only to the tax code in complexity, the Act has been
described as so convoluted that it "accelerate[s] the aging process of
judges."' 14 7 Immigration law's complexity invites creative statutory
interpretation but fails to provide an effective regulatory system.
The IMFA perpetuates this problem by engrafting complex provi-
sions upon an already convoluted statutory design. The effect is ex-
acerbated by the new law's additional incentives to engage in
strategic maneuvering.' 48 The complexity factor also increases the
likelihood that legislators may not fully comprehend the effect of
their enactments. In fact, there are indications that Senate support-
ers of the IMFA did not fully appreciate the severe consequences of
the legislation and may seek ameliorative amendments.
49
143. See, e.g., Gordon, The Need to Modernize Our Immigration Laws, 13 San Diego
L. Rev. 1 (1975); Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56
Colum. L. Rev. 309 (1956); Rosenfield, Necessary Administrative Reforms in the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act of 1952, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 145 (1953).
144. See, e.g., Rosenfield, supra note 143, at 145.
145. The list of critically needed reforms is long, but a sample follows. Lack of an
immigration statute of limitations has been identified as needing change. Maslow, supra
note 143, at 325. The application of the "reentry" doctrine should also be revised. It
fails to recognize communal and assimilative interests, and instead applies the same ex-
clusionary standards and procedural protections to resident aliens who temporarily
leave the country as to initial applicants for admission. SCIRP, supra note 15, at 284-87.
Granting administrative ability to waive certain exclusionary grounds would also provide
needed flexibility. Gordon, supra note 143, at 6-8. Another helpful modification would
be the lowering of unreasonably high standards, such as "extreme hardship," that con-
dition the conferral of discretionary antideportation waivers. SCIRP, supra note 15, at
278; Maslow, supra note 143, at 342-43.
146. See Gordon, supra note 143, at 2 (referring to the INA as "cumbersome, ob-
scure" and overly complicated); see also Rosenfield, supra note 143, at 145 n.2 (describing
in detail the complexity of the INA as enacted in 1952).
147. Lok v. I.N.S., 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977) (comparing the INA and tax codes
to "King Minos's labyrinth in ancient Crete").
148. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
149. See Schmidt, Selected Issues Under the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amend-
ments of 1986, in Immigration and Nationality Law, 42d Anniversary Symposium of the
American Immigration Lawyers Association, 2 Advanced Topics 51 (1988) (stating that
Senators "Simon and Kennedy, were unaware of the full extent of the harsh conse-
quences [of some parts of the IMFA]" and that "it is possible that [a portion of the
IMFA] will be modified by new legislation").
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The Select Commission's Report has been described as an effort
to "balance the requirements of efficient, sensible and fair enforce-
ment with due process protections and humanitarian concerns."' 150
Its adjustment of status and admission proposals recommended
movement away from policies damaging to family reunification.
Although professing to rely on the Commission's study as support
for enactment of the new legislation,' 5 ' Congress departed from the
report's recommendations in these areas. A particular concern of
the Commission was the impact of the backlogged visa system on
family unity:
There is something wrong with a law that keeps out-for as long as
eight years-the small child of a mother or father who has settled in
the United States while a nonrelative or less close relative from an-
other country can come in immediately. Certainly a strong incentive to
enter illegally exists for persons who are separated from close family members for a
long period of time. 152
Any meaningful reform should lessen the period of family separa-
tion, thereby decreasing the motive for fraud, and not merely focus
on punishing the incidents of fraudulent behavior.
The Select Commission also recommended that family reunifica-
tion remain as an important element of immigration policy.' 53 The
Commission not only specifically advised retention of the policy of
admitting immediate relatives without limitation, but also advised
that unmarried adult sons and daughters of citizens, as well as the
grandparents of citizens, be included in this group. 154 Furthermore,
the Commission provided strong arguments for retention of the ad-
justment of status in its prior form.' 55 Finally, it urged the consider-
ation of quota system reform to reduce the period of family
separation resulting from visa backlog.' 56 The Select Commission's
findings simply do not support IRCA's restrictive adjustment of sta-
tus provisions or the IMFA's harsh treatment of marital relation-
ships. 157  Moreover, to the extent that the Kennedy-Simpson
150. Fuchs, supra note 15, at 443.
151. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
152. SCIRP, supra note 15, at 15 (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 112 ("[p]sychologically and socially, the reunion of family members with
their close relatives promotes the health and welfare of the United States").
154. Id. at 114-15.
155. Id. at 205.
156. See id. at 116-17, 145-51.
157. See Fuchs, supra note 15, at 444 ("One major recommendation of the Commis-
sion, never even considered in the legislative process, was the proposal to eliminate
country and world ceilings for what is now second preference-the immediate relatives
of United States resident aliens-and to establish a separate, expanded number of visas
for immigration applications in that category.").
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legislation proposes further restrictions on family-related immigra-
tion, it too departs from the Commission's recommendations.
Despite its rhetoric, Congress has never provided the immigration
bureaucracy with sufficient resources to fulfill its statutorily man-
dated duties. Absent an overwhelming public interest in immigra-
tion-which occurs sporadically at best-legislators historically have
not accorded high priority to this issue of lack of resources. Since
the early 1900s, agency complaints of inadequate manpower and
support have fallen largely on deaf ears, 58 despite continuous
growth in the number of aliens seeking admission. Recent mass im-
migration of Indochinese, Cuban, and Haitian entrants has aggra-
vated the problem: 59 the INS must process these new arrivals, and
eventually adjudicate their requests for residence or citizenship, ex-
panding the agency's workload enormously. Now "[t]he time pe-
riod from arrival to citizenship can take up to seven years and
requires three separate INS adjudications."' 160 Furthermore, there
are indications that global pressures may lead to even greater levels
of future international migration.' 6' Increased agency duties result-
ing from IRCA will further burden effective INS functioning.
The State Department is also subject to increasing workload pres-
sure. From 1972 to 1980, the number of nonimmigrant visas issued
almost tripled to more than six million.' 62 By 1983, the backlog of
immigrant visa applications had reached approximately 1.5 mil-
lion. 163 Although Congress has attempted to eliminate fraud in visa
applications through draconian legislation, it has failed to allocate
resources sufficient to enable the immigration agencies to effectively
investigate such fraud.' 64 Workload pressures make it difficult for
158. See, e.g., M. Morris, supra note 140, at 90-91; Hiller, Immigration Policies of the
Reagan Administration, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 495, 496 (1983) (David Hiller, former Associ-
ate Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, commenting on the long-
standing underfunding of immigration enforcement efforts).
159. See, e.g., Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community:
Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 165, 168 (1983) (speaking of the new
"crisis" engendered by the influx of Cubans, Haitians, and Salvadorans).
160. Boswell, The Immigration Reform Amendments of 1986: Reform or Rehash?,
14J. Legis. 23, 34 n.58 (1987).
161. SCIRP, supra note 15, at 19-20.
162. M. Morris, supra note 140, at 96.
163. Id. The increase in the number of active immigrant visa cases has been steady
and persistent: "1983-1,411,151; 1984-1,587,360; 1985-1,777,931; and 1986-
1,903,475." Boswell, supra note 160, at 36 n.67 (citing U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of
Consular Affairs, Worldwide Visa Services During 1986, at 5 (Vol. 100, No. 5)).
164. For example, according to Bureau of Consular Affairs statistics, between 1974
and 1982, consular workload rose by 166% while personnel positions increased by 22%.
M. Morris, supra note 140, at 99. See also id. at 98 (indicating a need for improved facili-
ties and procedures in order to investigate fraud).
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consular officials to discover fraudulent applications. Consular of-
ficers reportedly now process a nonimmigrant visa application in an
average of two minutes or less,' 65 insufficient time to discover fraud-
ulent intent with any regularity.
Modern technological devices could significantly improve the im-
migration bureaucracy's efficiency. Computer automation and more
personnel are required to make the system work well.166 The State
Department has had some success in using computers to focus its
investigative efforts on nations whose applicants frequently commit
immigration fraud. 167 The INS, on the other hand, has experienced
major problems in computerizing operations; its data-gathering ca-
pacity lags behind that of other federal agencies regulating large
numbers of persons, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation or
the Social Security Administration. 68 This lag contributes to the
INS's unsatisfactory fraud investigation capability. 169 The Service's
data-gathering problems also reinforce its noted proclivity toward
enforcement, rather than service functions.170 In a setting of scarce
resources, severe time constraints, and information acquisition diffi-
culties, adjudication of immigrant benefits is not accorded high pri-
ority. 17  Besides damaging the agency's prestige and morale, these
inadequacies have proven costly to the Service in other respects.
Poor management practices have motivated Congress to withhold
money from the INS budget, and have also led to Government Ac-
counting Office criticism of the agency. 72
165. Id. at 96-97. There is evidence, too, that the INS suffers from a similar lack of
resources to adequately conduct fraud investigations. See Alienating Sham Marriages,
supra note 30, at 189 n.64 (the average INS interview "lasts only 10 to 15 minutes, which
is hardly sufficient time to make an informed evaluation of the bona fides of the mar-
riage") (citing Fraudulent Marriage and Fiance Arrangements to Obtain Permanent Res-
ident Immigration Status: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee
Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 170 (1981)).
166. M. Morris, supra note 140, at 102.
167. Id. (discussing the Bureau of Consular Affairs' development of data banks and
use of computers to process visa applications).
168. Id. at 114.
169. Id.
170. See Civil Rights, supra note 140, at 40-43.
171. M. Morris, supra note 140, at 125 (that the INS "has been unable to respond
adequately to some service demands is reflected in the massive backlogs and long delays
that have persisted in its adjudicatory work").
172. Id. at 131 ("after appropriating $3.7 million in fiscal year 1980 to automate the
INS district offices, Congress halted the effort because INS officials had failed to plan the
undertaking properly"); see also General Accounting Office, ADP Acquisitions: Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service Should Terminate its Contract and Recompete, No.
GAO-IMTEC-86-5 (1986). The INS's reputation even affects the degree ofjudicial con-
fidence afforded its decisions. Immigration Process & Policy, supra note 13, at 83.
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The expansion of INS statutory duties by enactment of the IRCA
employer sanctions and legalization programs has intensified the
agency's need for resources. In passing IRCA, Congress pledged
increased appropriations for the INS. 17s To compensate for past
funding deficiencies, however, such appropriation increases would
have to continue for an extended period. History casts doubt on
Congress's commitment to satisfying the budgetary needs of the im-
migration agencies either in the present or over the long run.
174
B. Immigration as the "Stepchild" of Administrative Law
Immigration law has long remained outside the mainstream of ad-
ministrative law. As a result, the immigration agencies have devel-
oped slowly, not benefiting from the evolution of administrative
theory and practice. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
t75
does not apply to deportations or to the proceedings of the INS's
highest adjudicatory review body, the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals (BIA).1 76 Unlike appellate bodies with similar authority, adju-
dication by the BIA is subject to reversal by the Attorney General.
173. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 94, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 5649, 5698.
174. See, e.g., INS Proposals for Legal Immigration Reform, 7 Immigr. L. Rep. 49, 52
(1988) ("the State Department ... is already instituting severe cutbacks in visa services
in response to congressionally mandated budget cuts"); State Department to Close
Seven More Consulates, 64 Interpreter Releases 226 (1987) ("Like the similar closings
of seven consulates last year... the move was prompted ... by sizable reductions in the
State Department's 1987 budget and the lack of any brighter prospects for 1988."); Ad-
ministrative Budget Request Shows Large Increase for INS, Cuts for Refugee Programs,
64 Interpreter Releases 29, 30 (1987) ("increases in INS's enforcement budget will not
be enough to fund all of the positions called for in the new [IRCA] .... Similarly, the
budget calls for a major increase in [the number of] INS investigators, but does not
provide enough money to fund the new positions."); Cash Shortfall May Hurt Immigra-
tion Law, Indianapolis News, Dec. 18, 1986, at 27.
175. Pub. L. No. 79-404, ch. 324, §§ 1-12, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). The APA was intended to
standardize federal agency rulemaking and adjudication procedures, and to ensure fair-
ness by prohibiting the commingling of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions and by
ensuring the independence of agency adjudicators. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339
U.S. 33, 41-45 (1950). Although APA procedures regulating formal adjudication do not
apply to either of the two immigration agencies, and the State Department is exempt
from its rulemaking requirements, INS rulemaking is subject to the Act. See Verkuil, A
Study of Immigration Procedures, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 1141, 1172 (1984). The INS has
avoided this inconvenience, however, by formulating policy largely through
adjudication.
176. See, e.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955); Giambanco v. I.N.S., 531 F.2d
141 (3d Cir. 1976); Cisternas-Estay v. I.N.S., 531 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1976).
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The BIA exists by virtue of regulation rather than pursuant to statu-
tory authorization.'7 The Select Commission's Final Report rec-
ommended the creation of a statutory Immigration Board subject to
the APA and independent of the Attorney General. 78 Already,
numerous adminstratively implemented procedural reforms have
brought the INS closer to the APA model of adjudication over the
course of several years.179 Existing deportation proceedings are suf-
ficiently formal that application of the APA would not significantly
burden the INS.' 80 Few persuasive reasons exist for failing to com-
plete the evolutionary journey by statutory fiat. Fears of procedural
burdens overwhelming agency resources are unwarranted so long as
exclusion proceedings remain exempt from APA formal procedural
requirements. Unfortunately, procedural reform is not a current
congressional priority. '8'
Although the INS does have rulemaking authority, its execution
has proven controversial.' 8 2 As early as 1947, the commissioner of
the INS stated that "[t]he process of rulemaking does not occupy an
important place in the activities of the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service."' 8i 3 The agency has largely declined to exercise its
substantive rulemaking powers, and has demonstrated a preference
for establishing precedent by individual adjudication. Particularly in
177. See, e.g., Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A
Study of the Immigration Process, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1297, 1375-78 (1986).
178. SCIRP, supra note 15, at 248. For examples of similar proposals, see, e.g., Rob-
erts, Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 San Diego L. Rev. 1
(1980); Roberts, The Board of Immigration Appeals: A Critical Appraisal, 15 San Diego
L. Rev. 29 (1977).
179. See generally Rawitz, From Wong Yang Sung To Black Robes, 65 Interpreter Re-
leases 453 (1988); Legomsky, supra note 177.
180. A brief experience in the 1950s suggests that the INS could survive application
of the APA without disastrous consequence. The Supreme Court, in Wong Yang Sung,
339 U.S. 33, held that the APA applied to deportation hearings. For seven months, until
Congress passed legislation reversing the decision, the INS complied with APA require-
ments. See Rawitz, supra note 179. This brief exposure to the APA was beneficial since
the agency returned to its former hearing procedures "with greater awareness of the
need to measure up to prevailing concepts of fairness and administrative due process."
Id. at 457.
181. Throughout the congressional immigration reform efforts of the 1980s, only
fleeting consideration has been given to procedural issues. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 98-
115, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 52-53 (1983) (proposing a statutory United States Immigra-
tion Board and the application of the APA to immigration judges). Analogous measures
have not resurfaced in subsequent legislative proposals.
182. See Sofaer, The Change-of-Status Adjudication: A Case Study of the Informal
Agency Process, 1 J. Legal Stud. 349 (1972) [hereinafter Case Study]; Sofaer, Judicial
Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 Colum. L. Rev.
1293 (1972).
183. Carusi, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 4 Monthly Rev. 95, 99 (1947).
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the adjustment of status context, this rulemaking abdication has re-
sulted in disparate treatment of similar cases, failure to guide both
courts and lower level agency administrators, and insufficient notice
to both practitioners and affected individuals of agency standards
governing the discretionary benefits.' 8 4 The United States Adminis-
trative Conference has recommended that the Service make rules to
provide standards for the exercise of adjustment of status discre-
tion.' 8 5 This advice and similar recommendations have not yet per-
suaded the INS to increase its rulemaking substantially.'
86
Moreover, existing Supreme Court precedent endorses agency dis-
cretion in this regard, so judicial intervention to improve the situa-
tion is unlikely. 187 The Service has ignored the example of other
184. See Case Study, supra note 182, at 349, 373 & accompanying notes; Verkuil,
supra note 175, at 1205 ("The statutory standards for adjustment of status ... are not
adequate to guide discretion and need to be redefined.... [Flailure to do so imposes
costs on the eligible class, whose applications may be treated unequally, and upon the
administrative system, which risks increased judicial supervision."). See also Wong Wing
Hang v. I.N.S., 360 F.2d 715, 718 (2d Cir. 1966) (referring to the need for administra-
tive development of standards under the suspension of deportation statute)..
185. Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 71-5 (1971)
observed:
Examiners who decide cases under section 245 usually obtain little guidance from
the statute, rules, standards or precedents. The lack or inadequacy of such gui-
dance often results in unequal justice and invites pressures upon Members of Con-
gress to intervene in individual cases. A large proportion of the decisions under
section 245 can and should be controlled by regulations which establish the rules
and standards for decision. These regulations should crystallize the existing body
of precedents, staff instructions and established traditions of decision into a form
which should. in the ordinary case both control discretion and provide a publicly
available body of the governing law. In drafting these regulations, the Service
should seek to restrict unnecessary or unwarranted discretion in reaching individual
decisions and should also seek to ensure that decisions are reached on grounds that
have a direct relationship to the purposes of section 245.
186. In 1979, the INS proposed rules with respect to adjustment of status, revoca-
tion of approved petitions, voluntary departure, and stays of deportation. 44 Fed. Reg.
36,187 (1979). The Service indicated that the proposed rules were necessary "in order
to place in our regulations the discretionary criteria we use in making administrative
decisions .. .[and that they were] intended to insure that all applications and petitions
submitted to this Service receive consideration under appropriate discretionary criteria
and are adjudicated in a fair and uniform manner throughout the United States." Id.
However the INS subsequently cancelled the proposed rules concluding that "[i]t is im-
possible to foresee and enumerate all of the favorable or adverse factors which may be
relevant and should be considered in the exercise of administrative discretion." 46 Fed.
Reg. 9,119 (1981). For a critique of this rationale, see Ludd, Administrative Discretion
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service: To Review or Not to Review?, 8 T.
Marshall LJ. 65, 81-82 (1982).
187. See Securities & Exchange Comm. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947)
("the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation
is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency") (em-
phasis in original). But see Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 654 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1981); Bahat
v. Sureck, 637 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1981); Konishi v. I.N.S., 661 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1981);
Patel v. I.N.S., 638 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1980). Other circuits have interpreted Chenery
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federal agencies, like the Social Security Administration, that use
their rulemaking power to eliminate the need for repetitive individ-
ual adjudications.' 8 8 Nor has the INS developed the technique of
using "structuring" or "confining" rules' 8 9 to limit its discretion or
to provide guidance to regulated individuals.
The effectiveness of rules in achieving their intended purpose can
be evaluated by examining three attributes: transparency, accessibil-
ity, and congruence.' 90 Rulemakers can strive for rule "trans-
parency" by using terminology that is easily and uniformly
understood by members of the affected population. 19' Transparent
rules reduce administrative or transaction costs. A rule's "accessi-
bility" refers to the ease with which it can be applied in appropriate
situations.192 Accessible rules can promote social and dignitary val-
ues by enabling regulated persons to participate in the application
of the standard to their individual cases. 193 Finally, the optimality of
a rule can be judged by its "congruence," or conformity to the pol-
icy objectives of its drafters. Congruence furthers moral objectives
by promoting, consonant with the rule's objectives, uniform out-
comes in individual cases.194 In practice, these three competing at-
tributes force drafters to engage in painstaking deliberation to
balance the concomitant values of all three in order to derive an
more literally and have declined to follow the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in requir-
ing agencies to make rules. See Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 7:25, at 179 (Supp.
1982).
188.1 See, e.g., Secretary of Health and Human Servs. v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458
(1983).
189. See generally K. Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (1969) [here-
inafter Discretionary Justice]. Professor Davis argues that agencies should use their ex-
pertise and statutory familiarity to create relevant standards since the legislatures and
courts largely lack this ability. See, e.g., Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 713 (1969). He accordingly identifies "structuring" and "confining" rules as the
primary means to control agency discretion. "[R]ules which establish limits on discre-
tionary power confine it, and rules which specify what the administrator is to do within
the limits structure the discretionary power." Discretionary Justice, supra, at 97. Davis
recognizes that initially the agency may be incapable of enacting a substantive rule to
govern its implementation of new statutory duties. The agency should, however, use
nonbinding policy statements or interpretive rules to provide guidance. After sufficient
experience is gained in the formulation and implementation of the statutory purpose,
Davis envisages an evolution from unconfined discretion toward rules. Id. at 108. INS
policy development in both the marriage fraud and adjustment of status areas would be
viewed as inadequate under Davis's theory of regulatory evolution.
190. See Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 Yale L.J. 65, 67
(1983). In this context, the term "rule" is used in its broader sense to encompass statu-
tory law.
191. Id. at 67, 92-97 (offering a theory to explain INS desire for opaque standards in
the implementation of the adjustment of status program).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 67, 71.
194. Id. at 71.
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appropriate mixture. Although the balancing process may be diffi-
cult, because it is often ad hoc and intensely fact dependent, failure
to balance imposes costs. Mechanical rules provide the greatest de-
gree of transparency, and sometimes accessibility, but usually at the
expense of over- or under-inclusiveness. Such rules generally sacri-
fice congruence to other values by failing to discriminate among
classes of individuals possessing disparate characteristics. The most
common example of such a rule is the "irrebuttable presump-
tion."' 195 Moreover, rules which are significantly over- or under-
inclusive generally result in disparity between drafter intention and
actual operation.
Attempts to provide a single normative principle that permits
decisionmakers to balance these attributes have been largely unsuc-
cessful. 196 Several general observations, however, can. be made.
First, agencies presented with heavy demands tend to favor trans-
parent rules.' 97 When statutes of general applicability are impre-
cise-as most statutes comprehensible to the general public are-
the burdens usually fall on the regulated populace rather than on
the regulating agency. The agency may therefore view such burdens
as externalities and apply transparent bright-line rules.'98 Second,
when the costs of over- or under-inclusive rules are high, rational
drafters should favor flexible rules.199 In the absence of perfect in-
formation, all rules suffer from some degree of either over- or
under-inclusiveness. When the affected interest is important, how-
ever, congruence should be pursued even at the cost of trans-
parency. This will not necessarily result in inefficiency since the
regulating agency avoids expending resources to address or defeat
the claims of those contesting transparent, arbitrary rules.
200
195. Id. at 68.
196. It has been suggested that the invocation of "moral values like fairness, equity
or community" represents a futile attempt to provide a normative standard of rule op-
timality and that efficiency criterion provides a more useful alternative. See, e.g., id. at 71-
*76. The task of applying appropriate measurement values to ascertain efficiency, how-
ever, appears to be equally elusive. Despite the fact that efficiency evaluation is usually
the prime component of regulatory analysis, the jurisprudential consideration of equita-
ble concerns remains unquestionably important. In some instances, controversial trans-
parency and congruence determinations require recourse to "moral judgment" or a
"libertarian model." Id. at 107. Given the IMFA's impairment of fundamentally impor-
tant interests, it represents a particularly appropriate instance for the application of the
latter theories. See infra text accompanying notes 209-10, 274-78.
197. Diver, supra note 190, at 75.
198. Id. at 103.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 72-73. The plethora of litigation under the IMFA validates this observa-
tion. See supra note 8. There is also evidence to suggest that the INS has lessened this
effect by using its "prosecutorial discretion" to avoid enforcing the immigration laws in
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Application of this analysis to the immigration laws at issue sug-
gests that these laws fail to provide an optimal, or even acceptable,
level of rule precision. The INS preference for implementing trans-
parent rules, particularly in the area of marriage fraud, is under-
standable given its investigative burdens. The IMFA's two year
banishment provision, however, diminishes dignitary and participa-
tion values by denying affected individuals the right to be heard,
although it is accessible in the sense that it can be applied to factual
situations with minimal effort. This over-inclusive irrebuttable pre-
sumption is particularly lacking in congruence, is of dubious benefit
as a fraud reduction device, and imposes high costs in cases of erro-
neous results. In this instance, as well as in the context of adjust-
ment of status legislation, congressional policymakers failed to
adequately weigh the external costs of inflexible bright-line
rulemaking. 20' The important interest of preserving family unity
demands a high level of rule congruence. Because they lack trans-
parency and accessibility, the IMFA's "extreme hardship" waiver
provisions20 2 also fail to achieve rule precision. Their ambiguity de-
fies easy agency administration and effectively bars regulated per-
sons from meaningful participation in application of the standard.
The disparate reaction of the different immigration agencies to-
ward the enactment of the IMFA and adjustment of status laws ex-
emplify bureaucratic behavior seeking to optimize managerial
convenience. State Department opposition to these measures not
only expresses concern for affected individuals, but also reveals the
agency's recognition that implementation will effect a serious drain
on State Department resources. In the adjustment context, addi-
tional demands are placed on already overburdened consular posts
by requiring aliens to make unnecessary trips abroad. The IMFA's
two year banishment provision will place burdens on the State De-
partment to certify and keep track of aliens during the waiting pe-
riod, to maintain a paper record for potential readmittants, and to
selective cases. See Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service Goes Public: The Litigative Use of the Freedom of Information Act, 14
San Diego L. Rev. 42 (1976) (describing the effect of the INS "deferred action"
program).
201. The lobbying efforts and political influence of regulated individuals usually en-
courage legislators to consider externalities and attributes of congruence. The fact that
these constraints are not as powerful when Congress legislates alien interests may ex-
plain that body's historical propensity to enact draconian immigration laws. See infra
note 212 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
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advise aliens of readmission procedures. 20 3 In contrast, the IMFA
permits the INS to conserve its limited resources by eliminating its
responsibility for conducting labor-intensive fraud investigations.
INS optimizing behavior (in the form of support for the IMFA and
adjustment provisions) is therefore ostensibly rational, given its re-
sponsibilities under the IRCA employer sanction and legalization
programs. Inconvenience to the INS under the new adjustment
program will not compare with that experienced by the State
Department.
Managerial convenience is not the only goal of effective legisla-
tion. An effective administrative system should achieve the goals of
efficiency, accuracy, and acceptability. 20 4 Administrative efficiency,
in contrast to allocative efficiency, entails minimizing process costs
and delay. 20 5 The IMFA's bright-line transparent rules may satisfy
this goal within INS but they do so by shifting administrative bur-
dens to the State Department. It is therefore doubtful that aggre-
gate efficiency has been achieved.
Whether accuracy-in the sense of remaining faithful to the statu-
tory design206 -is achieved is also questionable. The statute lacks
congruence because it is over-inclusive. Final resolution and review
of deportation proceedings may extend for several years, and genu-
ine relationships may be formed during this period. The law's fail-
ure to permit interested parties the opportunity to show good faith
in the resulting marriages sacrifices congruence for transparency.
Accuracy in implementing such a law does not suggest that truth has
been ascertained, but merely that this concern has been rendered
legally irrelevant.
An effective statute should also be deemed "acceptable" by regu-
lated individuals and by the general public. Persons denied the op-
portunity to demonstrate a bona fide marital relationship, as well as
affected family members, are likely to view the procedure as patently
unfair. Socially conscientious persons not directly regulated by the
IMFA may also be offended, since the law probably fails to satisfy
203. See, e.g., INS Lists Documents Needed Under Marriage Fraud Act, 64 Inter-
preter Releases 1122 (1987).
204. See Crampton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Sit-
ing, 58 Va. L. Rev. 585, 591-93 (1972). For analysis of these goals in the administration
of the immigration laws, see Legomsky, supra note 177, at 1313.
205. Cass, Allocation of Authority within Bureaucracies: Empirical Evidence and
Normative Analysis, 66 B.U.L. Rev. 1, 14 (1986).
206. Id. at 15.
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minimal standards of fairness. 20 7 Administrative law theory suggests
that such inappropriate results can be expected when individualiz-
ing discretion is sacrificed in circumstances requiring fact-depen-
dent determinations.
2 0 8
Congress's adoption of onerous statutes and failure to implement
meaningful reform have contributed to the ineffectual implementa-
tion of immigration laws.. The enactment of the IMFA and of the
IRCA adjustment of status legislation extends this historical pattern.
In addition to the inefficient characteristics of the laws described in
this section, certain provisions of these statutes may also impermis-
sibly impair constitutionally protected interests.
IV Constitutional Analysis
Constitutional doctrine has been influenced by the administrative
realities of implementing immigration laws. Millions of aliens seek
admission to the United States each year, either temporarily or per-
manently, and the Supreme Court has studiously avoided creating
constitutional doctrines that might further burden the immigration
bureaucracy's already strained resources. Moreover, the judiciary
has historically exhibited a powerful awareness of the limitations of
its constitutional function. Decisions regarding immigrant admis-
sion traditionally have been viewed as political questions committed
to the special province of the legislature.
This section examines the constitutional doctrines buttressing the
judiciary's reluctance to review immigration legislation and dis-
cusses the limitations of these doctrines. A channeling function, re-
ferred to as the "atrium principle," is proposed to allay the
"slippery slope" fear of opening the floodgates of immigration liti-
gation. The atrium principle should facilitate application of evolv-
ing communitarian and due process dignitary theories in this area.
These theories focus on the "functional social linkages actually
forged between aliens and the American people"209 and justify ex-
tension of judicial scrutiny beyond purely "instrumentalist" legal
207. See generally M. Walzer, Spheres ofJustice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality
42-63 (1983) (discussing the moral claims that alien residence may foster).
208. See, e.g., Koch, Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 469, 471-72 (1986); Discretionary Justice, supra note 189, at 19, 25-26.




analysis. 210 Applied in the context of the concession that policy de-
terminations of admission belong exclusively to the legislature,
these concepts offer a feasible solution to the constitutional chal-
lenge: they neither require the judiciary to address issues beyond its
institutional competence nor compel a procedural framework that
would overwhelm the immigration bureaucracy.
This constitutional analysis focuses on the IMFA's regulation of
citizen and permanent resident nuclear families. 2 11 These groups
present powerful communitarian and dignitary claims cognizable
under the atrium principle. This sectioh measures these claims
against due process and equal protection doctrine and briefly con-
siders constitutional issues relevant to the rights of conditional sta-
tus holders.
A. The Constitutional Challenge
Just as immigration operates outside the confines of administra-
tive law, it has been segregated from the mainstream of constitu-
tional law. As a result, the constitutional jurisprudence of
immigration law is unrivalled in its routine sanction of harsh and
excessive governmental treatment of individuals. Because the legis-
lature is "[u]nrestrained for all practical purposes by the prohibi-
tions of a constitution and undeterred by the fear that the voteless
objects of its antipathy will resort to political reprisals," it is free to
"embody into law its fears, hostilities, and suspicions of the
210. Professor Mashaw has proffered a "dignitary theory" of due process as an alter-
native to positivist right-privilege theory. In contrast to communitarianism's 'attention
to associational communal contacts, the dignitary theory focuses on individual interests
to "preserve and enhance human dignity and self-respect." Mashaw, Administrative
Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L. Rev. 885, 887 (1981) [herein-
after Dignitary Theory]. See generally Mashaw, "Rights" in the Federal Administrative
State, 92 Yale L.J. 1129 (1983); Mashaw, Administrative Due Process As Social Cost
Accounting, 9 Hofstra L. Rev. 1423 (1981); Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process
Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in
Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 28 (1976). -
211. Although the wisdom and efficiency of the adjustment of status amendments
are questionable, the inconvenience entailed in requiring a nonresident to return over-
seas to adjust status probably does not rise to constitutional proportions. Prior constitu-
tional challenges to similar statutes were unsuccessful. See Alvarez v. District Director of
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 539 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 918 (1976) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the INA's denial of adjustment
of status to western hemisphere aliens); Dunn v. I.N.S., 499 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1106 (1975). The resulting injury is not comparable to the IMFA's
forced two year separation of a married couple otherwise legally entitled to joint resi-
dence within the country.
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alien." 212 The United States Supreme Court, for example, has sus-
tained blatant racial and gender discrimination under the immigra-
tion laws that very likely would have been invalidated in other legal
contexts.213 Many of these decisions defy logical explanation
outside of the administrative context of immigration law;
"[i]mmigration students learn that in constitutional cases, the gov-
ernment almost always wins." 21 4 The constitutional challenge is to
develop a jurisprudence that recognizes valid judicial limitations but
also provides meaningful criteria to preserve constitutional coher-
ence and the values of individual dignity. The challenge is formida-
ble since the Supreme Court has "never invalidated a congressional
choice to exclude or deport particular classes of aliens. .... 215
It is unlikely that the judiciary will change this deferential posture
without a comprehensible theory allaying its apprehension about in-
volvement in the political decisionmaking process. This article
therefore proposes the "atrium principle" as a channeling function
to preserve and allocate limited judicial resources. Not every injury
is susceptible to judicial remedy; only legally recognized rights and
interests are afforded this protection.21 6 The atrium principle ac-
cepts the premise that the legislative prerogative to formulate initial
212. Maslow, supra note 143, at 309; see also Boswell, supra note 160, at 35 & n.65
(stating that aliens "must rely on small constituencies within the ... political structure
that protect foreigners' rights"). In addition, powerful political groups fearful of wealth
transfers to potential immigrants exercise considerable influence on legislators seeking
to maximize political support. See generally Shughart, Tollison & Kemenyi, The Political
Economy of Immigration Restrictions, 4 YaleJ. on Reg. 79 (1986).
213. Probably the most infamous racial exclusion was the nineteenth century exclu-
sion of Chinese immigrants. Chinese Exclusion Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25
(dicta suggesting the Act would withstand constitutional attack appears in Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 720 (1893)). Congress was also deemed to have the
power to deny citizen fathers the privilege to enable their illegitimate children to immi-
grate, while permitting mothers to enjoy this benefit. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792
(1977) (result overturned in 1986 by IRCA § 315(a), amending INA § 101(b)(l)(D), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(D) (Supp. IV 1986), permitting a natural father to bring his illegiti-
mate child to the United States "if the father has or had a bona fide relationship with the
person"). See generally L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 5-16 (1988); Legomsky,
Immigration Law and The Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev.
255, 282.
214. Nueman, Recalling the Role of the Constitution in Immigration Law, 64 Inter-
preter Releases 1273 (1987).
215. Id. at 1275.
216. Doctrinal constitutional theory does not require that the government provide
procedural process unless a recognized loss of "liberty" or "property" is threatened. J.
Nowak, R. Rotunda &J. Young, Constitutional Law, § 13.2, at 453 (3d ed. 1986) [here-
inafter Constitutional Law]. The breadth of these concepts could lead to the extension
ofjudicial protection to every aspect of individual life amenable to government regula-
tion. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has never accepted the expansive assertion that a
right to freedom from arbitrary state action itself triggers constitutional protection. See,
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admission decisions is constitutionally unassailable. 217 Acceptance
of this limitation, however, is not acquiescence to the lack of mean-
ingful judicial review.
Aliens afforded political admission have reached a point "beyond
the atrium" and possess interests that are no longer subject to the
legislative prerogative. Although the legislature may still regulate
interests "beyond the atrium," it must now justify its actions and
make them subject to judicial scrutiny. The dimensions of this post-
admission zone of protection are clarified by the distinction between
immigration law and immigration policy. In formulating immigration
policy, Congress accommodates conflicting interest groups and
crafts compromises, often by means of deft political maneuvering.
Questions of who and how many may enter are quintessential exam-
ples of political and economic decisions outside the realm ofjudicial
expertise. After formulation of these decisions, the political bargain
has been consummated; legally cognizable rights and interests have
been created. It then becomes the duty of administrators to execute
the "law," and the judiciary's responsibility to ensure that the exe-
cution conforms to minimal constitutional standards.
The enactment of IRCA and the IMFA should accelerate the
evolution of constitutional and administrative protections in immi-
gration law. The IRCA employer sanctions extend the INA's provi-
sions beyond the hapless alien to the general public. Labor law
attorneys familiar with "conventional administrative law" will invari-
ably bring the "more intrusive modes ofjudicial review into the im-
migration field" to protect their clients. 218 The IMFA exerts even
greater evolutionary pressures by provoking conflict between the
e.g., Van Alstyne, Cracks in "the New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Ad-
ministrative State, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 445 (1977). Instead, the nature of the specific
interest at stake must be identified as amenable to judicial protection. See, e.g., Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). Furthermore, property rights do not derive from
the constitution but "are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law... " 408 U.S.
at 577.
217. To clarify the dimensions of atrium theory it should be emphasized that the
principle channels judicial review only as to the legitimacy of specific admission claims.
Initially, Congress must make the majoritarian decision of whether a class of foreigners
may enter and reside in the United States. If Congress decided to punish an alien's
unlawful entry, however, this would implicate other substantive constitutional interests,
distinct from a claim to admission and therefore outside the confines of atrium theory.
In the context of the IMFA a political admission decision has been made to admit nu-
clear family relatives of citizens and permanent residents. Therefore, those family mem-
bers have passed beyond the atrium and due process must govern their individual
admission decisions.
218. Nueman, supra note 214, at 1276.
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deference historically afforded congressional immigration enact-
ments and the constitutional rights of association and privacy ac-
corded citizens, permanent resident aliens, and their spouses. In
such a battle, however, it is uncertain whether the existing foot-
soldiers of due process and equal protection are adequate to the
task of constraining the forces of deference without communitarian
and dignitary reinforcement.
B. Constitutional Doctrines of Immigration Deference
The Supreme Court has invoked several rationales to justify the
grant of broad legislative and executive discretion in the creation
and execution of immigration law. The court has unequivocally rec-
ognized plenary congressional authority in the immigration field.2 19
In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall described the nature of
plenary power as "complete in itself," and added that it "may be
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations,
other than are prescribed in the constitution.- 22 0 In Marshall's
view, the only other restraint on plenary authority is the political
influence exercised by voters. 22 1 The public policy constraints ordi-
narily present when domestic legislation is adopted are effectively
absent from the immigration setting. The ideological struggle in
the immigration area is perpetuated by the modern contention that
the plenary immigration power is constrained by the "prescribed"
provisions of the Bill of Rights. Because the relevant constitutional
provisions 222 refer to "persons," not citizens, there is no textual rea-
son for finding these constraints inapplicable to congressional
power over immigration.
The Court has also found authority to formulate political deci-
sions with foreign affairs consequences to be inherent in the concept
of sovereignty.223 A necessary element of this authority holds that
219. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) ("[O]ver no conceiva-
ble subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over the admis-
sion of aliens." (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339
(1909))); accord Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).
220. 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824).
221. Id. at 197.
222. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part: "nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." See also U.S.
Const. amend. V.
223. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu
v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (providing that "[i]t is an accepted maxim of
international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty,
and essential to preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions,
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an alien has no "right" to admittance but must accept whatever en-
try "privileges" Congress may choose to dispense, subject to
whatever conditions it may impose.224 There are strong indications
that underlying this "rights" thesis is the circular justification that
aliens are simply not members of the social and political
community.
225
Scholarly literature over the last three decades, however, has
greatly undermined the theoretical foundations of the plenary
power and foreign affairs doctrines. 226 Neither the immigration nor
the foreign affairs power is expressly set forth in the Constitution or
in other historical records that would provide insight into the fram-
ers' intent. Professor Henkin, referring to the constitutional basis
for Congress's broad exercise of foreign affairs authority, has ob-
served that "[i]t requires considerable stretching of language, much
reading between lines, and bold extrapolation from 'the Constitu-
tion as a whole,' and that still does not plausibly add up to all the
power which the federal government in fact exercises.
22 7
In United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp., however, the Supreme
Court indicated that the federal government's immigration power
derives from extra-constitutional sources of international law. 228 In
or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to pre-
scribe"); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581
(1889).
224. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (i950);
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
225. See, e.g., Comment, Petitioning on Behalf of an Alien Spouse: Due Process
Under the Immigration Laws, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 1747, 1768 (1986) ("[it is ... probable
that the tendency to view the alien as one who does not 'belong' to the national commu-
nity is pervasive and colors much of the traditional legal thinking about immigration
law") [hereinafter Spousal Due Process].
226. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 213; Martin, supra note 159; Hart, The Power of
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66
Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1953); Spousal Due Process, supra note 225; Note, Constitutional
Limits on the Power to Exclude Aliens, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 957 (1982) [hereinafter Con-
stitutional Limits].
227. L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and The Constitution 16-18 (1972). Professor Hen-
kin has suggested that the per se creation of a national government effectively mandated
that the powers common to sovereign states be vested in the federal government. Id. at
24.
228. 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936). The Court in effect found that the Constitution had
failed to delegate the full scope of immigration power exercised by the federal govern-
ment, because the Constitution conferred on the federal government only the power
that states had originally possessed. In the Court's view, therefore, the Constitution was
not intended to grant powers of external sovereignty since "the states severally never
possessed international powers." Id. The Court then traced the source of the federal
government's sovereign immigration power to Great Britain. Id. For a view critical of
this interpretation, see Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An
Historical Reassessment, 83 Yale L.J. 1 (1973).
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doing so, the Court countenanced the remarkable doctrine that limi-
tations on that authority were to be found not in the text of the
Constitution but in international law, custom, and practice. 229 This
doctrine fails to offer a persuasive justification for unlimited legisla-
tive prerogative for at least two reasons. First, the theory demon-
strably conflicts with the Court's review of the exercise of the
foreign affairs power in nonimmigration contexts. 230 Second, no
credible argument suggests that the government's exercise of an in-
herent power, which may not derive from the Constitution, is un-
constrained by the Bill of Rights.
231
Nor does the political character of immigration legislation insu-
late it from constitutional review. In Baker v. Carr, a case involving a
constitutional challenge to a state legislature's redistricting plan, the
Supreme Court formulated a test to determine whether a case
presented an unreviewable "political question. ' 232 The Court em-
phasized "the impossibility of resolution by semantic cataloguing"
and instead required a "discriminating inquiry into the precise facts
and posture of the particular case." 233 The political question doc-
trine does not support pervasive judicial deference since the bulk of
immigration litigation does not affect foreign policy. Baker requires
a case-by-case analysis of the degree to which judicial intervention
might impair foreign policy concerns. Such an inquiry should en-
compass not only review of legislative history and governmental as-
sertions but also consideration of whether "the provision in
question distinguishes between immigrants of selected nationali-
ties." 234 Recent case law suggests that the Court will not mechani-
cally use the political question doctrine to immunize immigration
laws from judicial scrutiny. 23 5
The right-privilege doctrine presents a more challenging obstacle
to constitutional review of immigration statutes. In contrast to the
doctrines discussed above, its influence is not limited to immigra-
tion law but extends throughout constitutional jurisprudence. 236
The doctrine is based on the internally consistent logic that if the
229. See, e.g., Constitutional Limits, supra note 226, at 968.
230. See Legomsky, supra note 213, at 264; Spousal Due Process, supra note 225, at
1764; Constitutional Limits, supra note 226, at 973-74.
231. See L. Tribe, supra note 213, § 5-3, at 305.
232. 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962).
233. 369 U.S. at 217.
234. Legomsky, supra note 213, at 268.
235. Id. at 299-303 (discussing I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)).
236. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (plurality opinion); but cf
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
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government may entirely withhold a benefit, it may attach any con-
ditions it deems appropriate to the grant of the benefit. 237 In the
context of immigration law, this reasoning has provided a rationale
for sanctioning arbitrary legislative and executive action.
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy 238 offered the Supreme
Court the opportunity to apply the right-privilege doctrine to the
INA. Ellen Knauff was the war bride of a United States citizen. She
sought admission in 1948 for naturalization but was detained at Ellis
Island without a hearing. The INS attempted to exclude Knauff per-
manently on the basis that "her admission would be prejudicial to
the interests of the United States." 239 Justice Minton aptly framed
the issue for the Court: "May the United States exclude without
hearing ... the alien wife of a citizen who had served honorably in
the armed forces of the United States during World War II?-240
The Court decided the issue by stating, "an alien who seeks admis-
sion to this country may not do so under any claim of right."
24 '
Cautioning that it was not addressing the circumstance where the
foreigner had already entered the country, the Court found that the
decision to exclude an alien seeking entry belonged to Congress.
242
237. The most cogent judicial statement of the doctrine is attributed to Justice
Holmes, speaking for the Massachusetts Supreme Court in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New
Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892), discussed in Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right Privilege Distinction In Constitutional Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439,
1439-40, 1458-64 (1968). Holmes offered the doctrine as an explanation for dismissing
the complaint of a petitioner terminated from employment as a police officer for alleg-
edly violating a regulation limiting political activities of the police. Justice Holmes's view
was that "petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but has no constitu-
tional right to be a policeman." 155 Mass. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517. Professor Van Alsytne
demonstrated, howeyer, that if Holmes's assertion is too broadly applied it becomes a
tautology:
Because the public force will not be brought to bear upon those who discharged
petitioner, he has no right to be a policeman. And because petitioner therefore has
no right to be a policeman, the public force will not be brought to bear upon those
who discharged him.
Van Alstyne, supra, at 1460. Van Alstyne points out that the "epigram scarcely presents
itself as an adequate basis for extinguishing constitutional review" since it fails to pro-
vide a reason why the "dismissal was constitutionally tolerable." Id. Professor Van Al-
styne also argues that the tautology is an inaccurate representation of Holmes's overall
constitutional jurisprudence. Id. at 1458-62.
Right-privilege reasoning is important in the immigration field since it forms the basis
for classical immigration law's theory of "restrictive nationalism," which in turn justifies
the judiciary's refusal to acknowledge rights independent of legislative grace. See, e.g.,
Schuck, supra note 209, at 48.
238. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
239. 338 U.S. at 539-40.
240. 338 U.S. at 539.
241. 338 U.S. at 542.
242. 338 U.S. at 543.
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The Court then made what has probably been the most cited procla-
mation in immigration case law: "Whatever the procedure author-
ized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is
concerned."243
The Court utilized the Knauffrationale three years later in Shaugh-
nessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei. 244 The Attorney General ordered
Mezei, who had resided in the United States for 25 years, perma-
nently excluded upon his return from a trip abroad. Mezei was un-
able to contest his exclusion since the Attorney General ordered his
departure without hearing, on the "basis of information of a confi-
dential nature, the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the
public interest." 245 The Court refused to require the government to
disclose its confidential information, citing Knauff for the proposi-
tion that aliens "on the threshold of initial entry" are entitled only
to congressionally granted procedures. 246 In effect, the Court sanc-
tioned the indefinite detention, without a hearing, of aliens seeking
entry.
Knauff and Mezei stand as testaments to the dangers of agency exe-
cution of the laws unrestrained by the Constitution. In each case
some evidence suggests that substantive administrative errors were
made, and, in fact, both aliens eventually gained entry after exten-
sive congressional and public protest.247 Knauff and Mezei demon-
strate the necessity of a review system capable of correcting
egregious administrative error, without the prompt of public outcry.
Although the basis for the Knauff and Mezei holdings has been de-
scribed as a "scandalous doctrine, deserving to be distinguished,
limited, or ignored," the Court has never overruled these cases and
243. 338 U.S. at 544 (emphasis added).
244. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
245. 345 U.S. at 208.
246. 345 U.S. at 212.
247. See, e.g., Immigration Process & Policy, supra note 13, at 253. Mezei was eventu-
ally "paroled" into the country after spending four years in administrative detention. Id.
In Knauff's case, largely due to newspaper exposure of her case, "administrative and
congressional hearings brought to light the tenuous nature of the evidence on which
exclusion was based." Rosenfield, supra note 143, at 165 (quoting Kimball, Rights of
Aliens in Exclusion Proceedings, 3 Utah L. Rev. 349, 354 (1953)). After two and one-
half years Knauff finally received a hearing before a Board of Inquiry and was informed
of the charge against her: "that allegedly she passed secret data to an Iron Curtain coun-
try." Id. Eventually the Board of Immigration Appeals ruled that she must be admitted
because of a lack of adequate evidence to support the exclusion. Id.
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still cites them as authority. 24a A careful reading of the cases, how-
ever, does not foreclose application of the atrium principle. Of key
importance is the Knauff Court's distinction between aliens, like El-
len Knauff, who are seeking admission and aliens who have already
"gained entry." In Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding.249 the Court consid-
ered INS detention, without hearing, of a permanent resident
spouse of a citizen returning from service as a seaman on an Ameri-
can vessel. The Court held that Knauff was inapplicable since it re-
lates "to the rights of an alien entrant and does not deal with the
question of a resident alien's right to be heard." 250 Interpreting the
government regulations as not applicable to permanent residents,
the Chew Court ruled that Chew was "entitled to due process."251
The Court stated that although the immigration law might change a
resident alien's rights on the basis of a voyage abroad, "it does not
follow that he is thereby deprived of his constitutional right to pro-
cedural due process.
252
A month later, considering these same regulations in the Mezei
case, the Court distinguished Chew by stating that the facts of the
latter case justified " 'assimilating' [Chew's] status for constitutional
purposes to that of continuously present alien residents entitled to
hearings .... "253 In the Court's view, Mezei's absence without au-
thorization, and his residence for several months behind the Iron
Curtain, provided sufficient rationale for denying him an equivalent
"assimilation.- 254 Notwithstanding the arguably excessive reliance
in Knauff and Mezei on physical presence rather than relational inter-
ests as the trigger for heightened constitutional scrutiny, these cases
do not lessen the utility of the atrium principle as a channeling de-
vice. The stubborn vitality of Knauff and Mezei is attributable to the
Supreme Court's refusal to invade the political domain of entry and
248. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 159, at 173-76 ("[D]espite what it said in Knauff, the
Court really could not have meant carte blanche for Congress in the treatment of ex-
cludable aliens .... Second, the Court was guilty of bad craftsmanship, misreading the
cases it invoked and ignoring many others that cannot be squared with the doctrine
Knauff announced."); 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 11:5, at 358 (2d ed.
1979) ("the holding that a human being may be incarcerated for life without opportunity
to be heard on charges he denies is widely considered to be one of the most shocking
decisions the Court has ever rendered"); Hart, supra note 226, at 1390-96. Despite this
criticism, the Court's continued reference to these cases shows their continuing vitality.
See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-33 (1982); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792
(1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972).
249. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
250. 344 U.S. at 596.
251. 344 U.S. at 600.
252. 344 U.S. at 601.
253. 345 U.S. at 214.
254. 345 U.S. at 214.
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admission decisions. The atrium principle respects this political
boundary but sets limits for the deference that can be accorded leg-
islative prerogative.
Broader analysis reveals persuasive conceptual grounds for limit-
ing application of the right-privilege doctrine. Although the logic of
the right-privilege distinction is internally consistent, it is not neces-
sarily externally justifiable. The theory is based on positivist concep-
tions of the role of government toward the individual. This
positivist view "sees government as prior to the individual, and thus
sees the rights of individuals as nonexistent except as recognized by
the government.- 255 In contrast, the individualistic conception of
the role of government "regards the proper sphere of government
activity as limited by pre-existing personal rights." 256 Both theories
have had a demonstrable influence on the development of immigra-
tion law, and it is accordingly inaccurate to assert that either view is
"right" in the mutually exclusive sense. Thus an absolutist adher-
ence to positivist theory in constitutional interpretation would be
both descriptively and normatively erroneous.
Several commentators have asserted that the right-privilege doc-
trine no longer offers a viable theory of constitutional analysis.
257
255. L. Tribe, supra note 213, § 5-16, at 355. For an excellent discussion of thejusti-
fications supporting positivist constitutional doctrine, see Smolla, The Reemergence of
the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too
Much, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 69, 73-75 (1982). Professor Smolla cites five basic rationales for
the right-privilege doctrine. First, courts must have some means of identifying interests
that will receive legal protection. Second, government largess can be viewed as a form
of charity. As such, "the recipient of a gift must accept it with strings that the giver has
attached." Id. at 74. Third, a contract analogy could be made that as part of the bargain
the recipient of the largess agrees to limited procedural protection. Viewed in the con-
text of "consent," procedural impairments may be considered less onerous. Fourth,
closely associated with the contract rationale is the idea that "government should have
greater latitude in its dealings with individuals when it acts as the proprietor of the pub-
lic business rather than as the pandemic regulator." Id. at 74-75. Finally, Smolla identi-
fies "deference to majoritarian sovereignty" as the strongest argument for the right-
privilege theory. Id. at 75.
There are reasons to question the wisdom of applying these rationales to the immigra-
tion field. First, the atrium principle provides a channeling function to identify legally
protected interests. In addition, given the nature of the immigration statutes, implica-
tions of voluntary "consent" to these provisions is at best attenuated. See Reich, The
New Property, 73 Yale LJ. 733, 737-38 (1964) (describing the dependency on most
programs of public largess as involuntary). Finally, the Bill of Rights provides "a set of
protections concerned preeminently with the liberal ideal of individual freedom from
majoritarian excess." Dignitary Theory, supra note 210, at 898.
256. L. Tribe, supra note 213, § 5-16, at 355.
257. See generally Van Alstyne, Cracks in "the New Property": Adjudicative Due Pro-
cess in the Administrative State, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 445 (1977); Van Alstyne, The Con-
stitutional Rights of Public Employees: A Comment on the Inappropriate Uses of an Old
Analogy, 16 UCLA L. Rev. 751 (1969); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439 (1968). Similar arguments
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Two seminal cases, Goldberg v. Kelly2 58 and Bell v. Burson,259 have
been cited as evidence that the "old right-privilege distinction, a key
element in the Court's reasoning in Knauff, has received a rude and
unceremonious burial." 260 Similar analysis has prompted some
commentators to urge its expurgation from judicial review of immi-
gration law based on the overly confident conclusion that "in mod-
em constitutional jurisprudence, the doctrine has been largely
abandoned."261
The right-privilege distinction, however, has never been aban-
doned by the Supreme Court, although particular Justices have ex-
hibited varying degrees of fidelity to the doctrine. Chief Justice
Rehnquist has served as the Court's most vigorous advocate of the
doctrine. Writing for a plurality in Arnett v. Kennedy,262 he applied
the principle to uphold the dismissal of a nonprobationary federal
civil service employee without a pretermination hearing. In finding
that where "the grant of a substantive right is inextricably inter-
twined with the procedures... employed in determining that right,
a litigant ... must take the bitter with the sweet." 2 63 Since the peti-
tioner had accepted the benefits of the employment under a statu-
tory scheme (the sweet), he could not complain about that
provision's termination procedures (the bitter). In effect, the "bit-
ter-with-the-sweet" principle simply restates the Knauff-Mezei admo-
nition that whatever procedure Congress provides constitutes
constitutional due process.
Arnett has been described as a "rejection" of Justice Rehnquist's
positivist theory because only two other Justices joined his opin-
ion.264 The accuracy of this observation is questionable, though, as
the majority of concurring Justices in Arnett have used right-privilege
reasoning in subsequent cases. 265 A mere two years after Arnett, Jus-
tice Rehnquist's bitter-with-the-sweet approach could be described
have been advanced that the right-privilege doctrine is no longer justifiable in the field
of immigration law. See, e.g., Spousal Due Process, supra note 225, at 1765-66; Constitu-
tional Limits, supra note 226, at 975-77.
258. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that a welfare recipient has a due process right to
a hearing before the cessation of benefits despite the fact that the statute provided no
pretermination procedure).
259. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
260. Martin, supra note 159, at 167 (citations omitted).
261. See, e.g., Constitutional Liimits, supra note 226, at 977.
262. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
263. 416 U.S. at 153-54 (plurality opinion).
264. See, e.g., L. Tribe, supra note 213, § 10-12, at 707-08.
265. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
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as commanding "a majority of the court." 266 Justice Powell demon-
strated his fact-specific willingness to use the doctrine dissenting in
Goss v. Lopez. 26 7 Moreover, Justices White, Stevens, and Blackmun
have periodically applied variations of bitter-with-the-sweet reason-
ing.2 6 8 Whether the Court will apply or reject the right-privilege
distinction in a particular case apparently depends upon its view of
the importance of the interests at issue.
The emergence of the modern'administrative state has increased
the importance of status acquired through statutory entitlements.2 69
Judicial failure to require fair procedure when statutory "rights" are
impaired leaves "almost no check on the power of government to
limit individual freedom." 270 Several limitations to the right-privi-
lege doctrine serve to curb this extreme. First, vestiges of natural
law theory remain. To the extent that individual interests are
deemed constitutionally "fundamental," judicial scrutiny of govern-
mental action intensifies. Such interests are either expressly identi-
fied in the Constitution or have been implicitly recognized as
necessary to protect individual liberty.27' The doctrine of "uncon-
stitutional conditions" also lessens the impact of the right-privilege
distinction by prohibiting the government from indirectly realizing,
by conditioning "benefits," results that it may not directly accom-
plish.2 72 Finally, equal protection serves as a constraint against ex-
cessively discriminatory programs involving government largess.
This constitutional standard operates without regard to the right-
privilege doctrine since its essential concern is the discriminatory
treatment of similarly situated individuals.
273
266. See Smolla, supra note 255, at 92.
267. 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
268. See Dignitary Theory, supra note 210, at 893-94 & accompanying notes.
269. See Reich, supra note 255, at 733-39.
270. Constitutional Law, supra note 216, § 13.2, at 453-54.
271. See, e.g., id. § 11.7, at 367:
U]ustices of the Supreme Court will apply strict forms of review under the due pro-
cess clause and the equal protection clause to any governmental actions which limit
exercise of "fundamental" constitutional rights. These are rights which the Court
recognizes as having a value so essential to individual liberty... that they justify the
justices reviewing the acts . . . in a manner quite similar to the substantive due
process approach of the pre-1937 period. Little more can be said to accurately de-
scribe the nature of a fundamental right, because . . . [the] analysis is simply no
more than the modern recognition of the natural law.
272. See, e.g., O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings At-
tached, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 443 (1966); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 1595 (1960).
273. See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952).
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C. Evolutionary Concepts in Search of the "Transformation"
Professor Schuck has described the development of a communi-
tarian concept that may lead to the transformation of immigration
law. 274 The embryonic communitarian ideal is not susceptible to a
precise definition, but is "a hazy term used to describe any number
of different political theories, which may range from conservative
Burkean notions to radical left conceptions of the state. ' 275 The
hallmark of communitarianism, however, is its focus on the assimila-
tive connections and communal interrelations that the alien has es-
tablished. Although judicial precedent has recognized that the alien
is afforded "a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases
his identity with our society," historically the courts have deferred
to the legislature's political decisions in ascertaining whether the
alien had any claim to the scale. 2 76 Communitarian theory does not
permit the courts to acquiesce in statutory classification when mea-
suring the nature of the alien's legally cognizable interests. Instead
it advocates use of a "functional" analysis evaluating the importance
of relationships irrespective of legislative categorization.
Communitarian theory pressures the judiciary to moderate the
doctrine of absolute sovereignty by insisting on balancing the indi-
vidual's communal relationships against state actions restraining in-
dividual liberty. Schuck has located the origins of communitarian
ideals in classical liberal ideology. 2 77 Since classical liberal theory
traced individual Iights to the human dignity inherent in all persons,
274. See Schuck, supra note 209. For other works either applying Schuck's analysis of
the applicability of communitarian influences on immigration law or considering related
concepts, see Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1471, 1494-
98 (1986); Schauer, Community, Citizenship, and the Search for National Identity, 84
Mich. L. Rev. 1504 (1986); Legomsky, supra note 213, at 304-06; Verkuil, supra note 175,
at 1144; Martin, supra note 159, at 193-200; Note, Extended Voluntary Departure: Limit-
ing the Attorney General's Discretion in Immigration Matters, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 152,
167-76 (1986) [hereinafter Voluntary Departure]; Developments in the Law-Immigra-
tion Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1286, 1292-94, 1303-08 (1983).
275. Aleinikoff, supra note 274, at 1494.
276. SeeJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950); Schuck, supra note 209, at
13-14 ("[Tlhe classical conception of the national community ... is that it was preemi-
nently a political, not a judicial, artifact. Congress defined the qualifications for, and
attributes of, each of the legal statutes that comprised it, and the Attorney General ad-
ministered that definition.").
277. Schuck, supra note 209, at 2. In discussing the nation's expansive immigration
policy and open borders that existed through the 1880s, Schuck notes the relationship
to "Lockean liberal theory":
The liberalism of America's first century conceived of persons as autonomous, self-
defining individuals possessing equal moral worth and dignity and equally entitled
to society's consideration and respect. This entitlement was in principle universally
shared, a natural right deriving not from the particularities of one's time, place, or
status, but from one's irreducible humanity.
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rather than to state recognition, government restrictions on individ-
ual interactions or contractual associations were viewed as
illegitimate.
278
Although communitarian theory as a facet of immigration law "is
as yet only embryonic, tentative and fragmentary,- 279 it has been
noted that "the first faint flickerings of this new ideology are appar-
ent" in the implementation of immigration law. 28 0 Communitarian
principles provide the most coherent explanation for an otherwise
baffling series of Constitution-based cases recognizing alien rights.
Although the lower federal courts have been the most active in pro-
tecting communitarian concerns, 28' the Supreme Court has also re-
sponded to these interests. In Plyler v. Doe28 2 the Court overturned
on equal protection grounds a Texas statute that limited the access
of children of undocumented aliens to public education by authoriz-
ing local school districts to charge them tuition. This decision was
remarkable in light of the petitioners' illegal status under the INA,
the Court's refusal to hold that alienage is a per se suspect classifica-
tion mandating strict scrutiny,28 3 and the Court's longstanding re-
fusal to find that public education is a fundamental right. 28 4 To
provide relief, the Court in effect "cross-bred alienage, a sometimes
'suspect' classification, with poverty, a normally non-suspect classifi-
cation, to produce a quasi-suspect class comprising the children of
illegal aliens who had no control over their unlawful presence in this,
Id. (citations omitted). Although Schuck uses the term "liberalism" to refer to these
principles, it is clear that he does not use the term in its modem sense. "Classical lib-
eral" is a more helpful description of this theory in order to differentiate it from the
commonly used descriptions, "liberal" and "conservative." See Malloy, Equating
Human Rights and Property Rights-The Need for Moral Judgment in an Economic
Analysis of Law and Social Policy, 47 Ohio St. LJ. 163, 164 (1986).
278. In Schuck's view, however, the excessive zeal of classical liberal theory and its
inability to distinguish between invalid state regulations and legitimate attempts to de-
fine the limits of the national community permitted the emergence of "restrictive nation-
alism." See Schuck, supra note 209, at 85-88.
279. Schuck, Immigration Law and the Problem of Community, in Clamor at the
Gates 298 (1985).
280. Voluntary Departure, supra note 274, at 170.
281. See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 209, at 58, 59-85 ("the emergent judicial assertive-
ness in the face of federal regulation of immigration essentially remains a lower court
phenomenon"); Legomsky, supra note 213, at 304.
282. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
283. The Court indicated that, under appropriate circumstances, the state could per-
missibly make legislative choices based on unlawful immigration status. 457 U.S. at 220.
See also L. Tribe, supra note 213, § 16-23.
284. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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country."2 85 To avoid the likely results of the state statute-the cre-
ation of a permanent caste of politically and economically disadvan-
taged persons-the Court apparently decided that Texas could be
constitutionally required to expend public money to provide free
education to these children. 286 Justice Powell, concurring in the de-
cision, was careful to note the "unique circumstances" justifying re-
lief.287 Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, predicted that because
of "such a unique confluence of theories and rationales" the case
would be of questionable precedential value. 288 Professor Schuck
has opined, however, that Plyler could constitute "the most powerful
rejection to date of classical immigration law's notion of plenary na-
tional sovereignty over our borders." 289 To the degree that Plyler
evaluated the true communal posture and social interrelations of the
individuals involved, and recognized that their residence would
likely continue even without legal authorization, the case exempli-
fies an overwhelming array of communitarian factors "trumping" a
legislative classification. In addition, Plyler signals the Court's un-
willingness to sanction a legislative classification based on alienage
where "its efficacy was dubious and its goals insubstantial." 290
Plyler's usefulness as a barometer of the constitutional influence of
communitarian principles could be questioned since it invalidated a
state, not federal, statute. Prior Supreme Court immigration deci-
sions have not afforded the same degree of judicial deference to
states as to the federal government. 29' That characterization is not
persuasive, however, given the Supreme Court's decision in Landon
v. P/asencia.292 Plasencia was the permanent resident spouse of a
United States citizen, and the mother of their minor children. She
and her husband traveled to Tijuana, Mexico, and attempted to as-
sist the unlawful entry into the United States of several Mexican and
285. L. Tribe, supra note 213, § 16-52, at 1657.
286. 457 U.S. at 218-19.
287. 457 U.S. at 239 (Powell, J., concurring).
288. 457 U.S. at 243 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
289. Schuck, supra note 209, at 58. For other sources discussing the significance of
Plyler, see, e.g., Perry, Equal Protection,Judicial Activism, and the Intellectual Agenda of
Constitutional Theory: Reflections On, and Beyond Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 329
(1983); Lichtenberg, Within The Pale: Aliens, Illegal Aliens, and Equal Protection, 44 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 351 (1983); Gerety, Children in the Labyrinth: The Complexities of Plyler v.
Doe, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 379 (1983).
290. L. Tribe, supra note 213, § 16-3, at 1445.
291. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717
(1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). But cf. Schuck, supra note 209, at 66
("Plyler v. Doe, although involving a state classification, may evince an increasing judicial
hostility to federal alienage classifications as well, at least where the power to define
'political community' is not plausibly at issue." (citation omitted)).
292. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
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Salvadoran nationals. The INS found the aliens in the Plasencias'
car at the border and detained Plasencia. Since she was entering the
country, the INS subjected her to exclusion rather than to deporta-
tion proceedings. Plasencia asserted that subjecting her to the
lesser procedural protections of exclusion 29 3 violated due process.
The Court held that the INA's failure to afford returning residents
a full hearing did not foreclose the necessity of determining the con-
stitutionally required procedures due a returning resident alien. The
Court distinguished Knauff by noting that "once an alien gains ad-
mission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with
permanent residence, his constitutional status changes accord-
ingly." 29 4 Refusing to find that the statute that admitted Plasencia
also defined her constitutional procedural protections, the Court
held that. application of the test elaborated in Mathews v. Eldridge
was required to balance Plasencia's interests against the govern-
ment's need for summary procedures. 295 The Court noted that her
"weighty" interests encompassed "the right to stay and live and
work" in the United States and "the right to rejoin her immediate
family, a right that ranks high among the interests of the individ-
ual." 29 6 Plasencia, therefore, confirms that the Supreme Court will
decline to apply bitter-with-the-sweet reasoning even when subject-
ing federal law to constitutional review if it considers the regulated
interests sufficiently substantial.
The lower federal courts have also recognized the importance of
communitarian interests in constitutional review of the INA. Sec-
tion 212(c) 29 7 of the INA provided a waiver of certain statutory ex-
clusions to long-time permanent resident aliens returning after
travel abroad, but denied the benefit to such residents who had not
left the country. In Francis v. I.N.S., the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit found that the provision constituted a violation of
293. See Matter of Lam, 18 I. & N. Dec. 15 (BIA 1981) (explaining the procedural
differences between exclusion and deportation hearings); see generally Comment, "Entry"
as an Issue in Immigration Law, 21 San Diego L. Rev. 137 (1983).
294. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32. It is also worthy of note that the Court cited to Chew
and stated that although its "holdings was one of regulatory interpretation, the rationale
was one of constitutional law." 459 U.S. at 33. Pursuant to the Court's reasoning, Chew
was entitled to greater procedural protection because his status was "assimilate[d] ... to
that of an alien continuously residing and physically present in the United States." 459
U.S. at 33.
295. 459 U.S. at 34 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
296. 459 U.S. at 34.
297. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1982).
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the equal protection component of the due process clause. 298 Ac-
knowledging congressional authority to apply different admission
standards to different classes of aliens, the court held that "once
those choices are made, individuals within a particular group may
not be subjected to disparate treatment on criteria wholly unrelated
to any legitimate governmental interest." 299 Although the court de-
termined that the constitutional standard of review for federal immi-
gration statutes differentiating among aliens was the "rational
basis" test, it deemed the statute irrational.300 The court held that
the benefit at issue must be extended to petitioner, since it was illog-
ical to distinguish the alien "whose ties with this country are so strong that
he has never departed," from an alien "who may leave and return
from time to time." 30 ' As in this case, long-standing communitarian
relationships have influenced administrative interpretation of the
INA, often disguised as orthodox statutory construction.
30 2
The atrium principle, however, limits judicial expansion of com-
munitarian interests. In Tovar v. LN.S.3 0 3 an alien sought review of
an INS denial of suspension of deportation based on her inability to
show that deportation would result in extreme hardship to a citizen
child. Tovar argued that her citizen grandchild should be treated as
her functional child since their relationship closely resembled that
of parent and child. The court, in agreeing that the INS should con-
sider hardship to the grandchild, ignored the clearly defined statu-
tory meaning of the term "child." Although the decision recognized
important relational interests, it did so in a manner that invaded the
domain of political policymaking. The atrium principle checks such
expansion. For purposes of Tovar, grandparents have not been
accorded entry under political admission decisionmaking and,
298. 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976). Although the court referred to "equal protec-
tion," its opinion was actually based on the judicially recognized equal protection com-
ponent of the fifth amendment's due process clause. See 532 F.2d at 272 & n.5.
299. 532 F.2d at 273.
300. 532 F.2d at 271-73.
301. 532 F.2d at 273 (emphasis added). Accord Tapia-Acuna v. I.N.S., 640 F.2d 223
(9th Cir. 1981); Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581 (BIA 1978).
302. For example, in Matter of Pagnerre, 13 I. & N. Dec. 688 (BIA 1971), the BIA
held that because of the continuing relationship between the parties, a stepmother could
file an immigration petition for her stepdaughter, even though the stepmother had re-
married after the death of her former husband, who was the beneficiary's father. The
holding is remarkable in that it does not necessarily follow from an express reading of
the INA.
303. 612 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1980).
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therefore, have not reached a point "beyond the atrium." It is not
surprising that the Supreme Court rejected the Tovar approach.3
0 4
The Knauff-Mezei doctrine represents a cogent but brutal decision
to avoid both judicial policymaking and further burdening of the
immigration bureaucracy. Accordingly, it "is no small thing to up-
set a precedent that, formally at least, has set the terms of due pro-
cess application to a defined class of problems for thirty years."-
30 5
Although the doctrine's draconian effect has not been entirely elimi-
nated, evolving communitarian and dignitary concerns have miti-
gated its severity. The atrium principle offers a rudimentary theory
to support a concomitant limit on political decisionmaking by chan-
neling judicial intervention on behalf of communitarian and digni-
tary interests. This analysis identifies the minimum requirements of
a successful constitutional challenge to the IMFA. First, aliens af-
fected by the IMFA must be deemed to have passed beyond the
atrium of political admission. Second, to defeat right-privilege rea-
soning in the face of undeniable governmental need to regulate
fraud, the judiciary must consider the interests of concerned parties
as sufficiently important to justify more than a "rational basis" stan-
dard of constitutional review.
D. The Constitutionality of the IMFA
Contemporary constitutional doctrine does not require thit the
government provide procedural protection unless a recognized loss
of "liberty, or property" is threatened. Aliens denied the opportu-
nity to establish marital validity to avoid deportation satisfy the pre-
requisites of the atrium principle. Congress already has decided to
admit the spouses of citizens and permanent residents; the courts
then should recognize the communitarian and dignitary interests of
these persons. If these interests were acknowledged, individual fa-
milial associational rights would be balanced against the govern-
ment's need for summary procedure. The first part of this section
indicates that such balancing would probably result in the grant of a
marital validity hearing to affected individuals. To the extent that
304. See I.N.S. v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85 (1986) (per curiam) (reversing a lower federal
court decision that considered hardship to the alien's two nieces in determining extreme
hardship under the suspension of deportation statute). The Court held that the statu-
tory definition of child is "particularly exhaustive" and limited to an unmarried legiti-
mate or legitimated child or stepchild under twenty-one years of age." 479 U.S. at 88 &
n.5.
305. Martin, supra note 159, at 171.
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evolving transformational values have not been sufficiently estab-
lished, however, courts might apply right-privilege reasoning and
decline to balance interests to determine individual procedural
entitlement.
The equal protection clause, however, may provide process pro-
tection even without the delineation of a discernable "right." The
IMFA's impairment of a combination of important interests sug-
gests that the statute should be subjected to intermediate scrutiny.
Supreme Court precedent, however, indicates that the court may be
unprepared to apply this level of review to federal immigration leg-
islation. Nevertheless, this Article argues that relief should be af-
forded under the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. Applied in the
context of this doctrine, equal protection functions like due process,
since the relief in the event of the state's failure to provide necessary
individualization is a constitutionally mandated hearing.30 6 The sec-
ond part of this section contends that the IMFA presents appropri-
ate circumstances for application of this doctrine.
1. Due process. Under the due process clause, aliens have a
constitutional liberty interest that must be recognized when expul-
sion proceedings are instituted against them.30 7 Furthermore, citi-
zens and permanent residents may have the fundamental right to
marry and associate with the mate of their choice without forfeiting
residence in the United States. Under some circumstances the
IMFA permits aliens to contest expulsion and present evidence in
their behalf. Aliens who marry during the pendency of proceedings
contesting their right to remain in the country, however, are denied
any opportunity to establish the validity of their marriages. These
aliens have already passed "beyond the atrium" because Congress
has made the political decision to admit applicants with similar mari-
tal relationships. Whether Congress can constitutionally deny pro-
cedural safeguards based on the timing of the marriage is not a
fundamental political choice but rather "conditioning" a right. This
condition should be subject to the same type of scrutiny that
Plasencia applied to the congressional decision to deny returning
permanent residents full procedural protection.
Aliens denied a marital validity hearing have due process liberty
interests that should be balanced against the government's asserted
306. Under the equal protection clause, a court can render an irrebuttable presump-
tion rebuttable by affording the affected individual the opportunity to contest the matter
in contention. See Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine In the Supreme Court,
87 Harv. L. Rev. 1534, 1536 (1974).
307. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954).
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need for summary procedures. The Supreme Court has never sanc-
tioned the deportation of a permanent resident alien without a hear-
ing. 3° 8 The important determination remaining is whether aliens
married to citizens or permanent residents can be constitutionally
viewed as functionally equivalent to permanent residents. It is diffi-
cult to distinguish the relational interests of the two classes. Con-
gress has not convincingly supported the presumption that aliens
marrying during expulsion proceedings have more incentive to
marry for immigration benefits than aliens overseas waiting for ad-
mission under backlogged quota categories.
Claimants denied a marital validity hearing present sufficiently
powerful relational interests and ties to the country to be constitu-
tionally "assimilated" to the status of permanent resident aliens, as
in Chew. This conclusion is faithful to the spirit of Plasencia.
Although Plasencia was a permanent resident, the INS sought to ad-
judicate her right to remain in the country under statutory proce-
dures Congress deemed sufficient. The Court, however, refused to
defer to this legislative choice and required an independent consti-
tutional balancing of procedural entitlement. The IMFA provides
no procedural protection to individuals whose interests are identical
to those of permanent residents. In weighing the constitutional lib-
erty interests of these parties, the Court could consider the statutory
design constitutionally inadequate.
Under Plasencia, important communitarian and dignitary concerns
require that the IMFA's hearing denial be subjected to the three-
part balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge309 to ascertain what pro-
cess is constitutionally due aliens under these circumstances. Other-
wise, functional social relationships and individual interests of
constitutional importance would be subsumed under a statutory cat-
egory rendering them irrelevant. In Mathews, the Court considered:
first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; sec-
ond, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or sub-
stitute, procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative bur-
dens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail. 3
10
Under the first Mathews criteria, there is little doubt that an alien's
interests in remaining in the country and maintaining immediate
308. See Constitutional Law, supra note 216, § 13.4, at 470 & n.62.
309. 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976).
310. 424 U.S. at 335.
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family unity are "weighty" concerns.3 1 I The claims of citizen and
permanent resident spouses are similarly important since the Court
has described marriage as "the most important relation in life . . .
having more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than
any other institution.- 31 2 The strain of enforced separation might
lead to dissolution of legitimate marriages. In addition, the alien is
deprived of judicial protection under the IMFA's banishment since
judicial review of consular officer visa denial is unavailable.
In contrast, the government's interest in the IMFA's statutory pre-
sumption must be carefully identified. To find that judicial review
of the IMFA would impinge upon governmental foreign affairs deci-
sionmaking would be erroneous. Such "semantic cataloguing"
would ignore the IMFA's overriding domestic focus and the fact that
the Act does not distinguish between "immigrants of selected na-
tionalities." 31 3 The government does, however, have a significant
interest in preventing fraud. Although the government has offered
some statistical support for the assertion that three of ten immigra-
tion marriages are fraudulent, it has never offered empirical evi-
dence to even suggest a high incidence of fraud among individuals
marrying during the pendency of expulsion proceedings. The "risk
of erroneous deprivation" may in fact be unacceptably high since
the expulsion process can continue for years. The presumption that
any relationship fformed during this period is fraudulent is probably
over-inclusive.
The claim that the IMFA reduces administrative and fiscal bur-
dens is also problematic. The IMFA actually requires increased ex-
penditure of administrative resources in tracking potential
immigrants during the period of exile rather than immediately adju-
dicating marriage validity. The burden of determining marital valid-
ity is not avoided, but merely delayed, and ultimately shifted from
the INS to the State Department. This reallocation of administrative
burdens explains the former agency's support of the IMFA and the
latter's opposition. The only real conservation of administrative re-
sources occurs when the statute entirely discourages the filing of ad-
mission petitions. Although arguably the two year requirement
might remove the incentive to marry during expulsion proceedings,
it also deters valid marriages. Finally, analysis of the administrative
311. See, e.g., 424 U.S. at 334-35.
312. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
313. See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
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burdens resulting from affording procedural protection does not
validate the IMFA's statutory scheme.
The alternative procedure is a marriage validity hearing. Such a
hearing would probably prove less of an administrative burden than
current expulsion proceedings. Determination of marriage validity
would not be outside the scope of the INS's competence or experi-
ence. The IMFA requires the INS to make the same type of finding
in terminating conditional status. The marriage validity hearing
could properly consider such issues as length of relationship, exist-
ence of children, and commingling of assets. Couples who could
successfully demonstrate marital legitimacy would be spared
separation.
The IMFA's denial of such a hearing derives from Congress's
preference for using time rather than investigation as a means of
determining marriage validity. This choice, however, has been
made at the expense of communitarian and dignitary concerns. If
immigration law has evolved to the point of considering actual rela-
tionships, then a statutory classification will not per se foreclose judi-
cial balancing of the communitarian interests at stake. The IMFA's
refusal to provide a process permitting individuals even the slim-
mest possibility of demonstrating marital validity is incompatible
with dignitary values. A balancing of the uncertain benefits accruing
to the state when hearings are denied against the resulting injury to
family associations does not favor the government's position.
On the other hand, if transformational values are insufficiently en-
trenched, the courts may simply fail to reach the point of balancing
the competing interests. The judiciary's decision depends upon the
remaining strength of the Knauff-Mezei doctrine. Knauff counte-
nances deference to statutory classification without consideration of
relational interests, while Mezei denies the existence of "rights" of
aliens seeking admission. It is difficult, however, to rely on Knauff-
Mezei to buttress the IMFA. Such an approach would require distin-
guishing Chew and Plasencia, and a persuasive explanation of why
these aliens have not passed "beyond the atrium" of political pre-
rogative to the realm of constitutional protection. If consideration
is given to the functional social interactions and associations of
aliens married to citizens and permanent residents, then bitter-with-
the-sweet reasoning must give way to judicial balancing.
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2. Equal protection. The equal protection clause mandates that
persons similarly situated receive equal treatment. Unlike due pro-
cess analysis, it does not require identification of a definitive "right"
before statutory discrimination may be subjected to judicial scru-
tiny. The IMFA's obviously over-inclusive distinction is its differen-
tiation between those who marry before the institution of
proceedings and those who marry afterward. The former are per-
mitted to show marital validity, while the latter are denied that op-
portunity, irrespective of the marriage's legitimacy. In subjecting
this statutory classification to equal protection analysis, however,
several important factors must be recognized.
Doctrinal equal protection analysis is bounded by the degree of
judicial scrutiny to be afforded to the interests at issue. In determin-
ing the legitimacy of the IMFA, the courts must decide whether a
standard ofjudicial scrutiny higher than a "rational basis" should be
applied. Since it is "rational" for the state to presume the existence
of possible fraud on the part of individuals marrying under the
threat of expulsion proceedings, the statute is probably not vulnera-
ble to constitutional challenge under this standard. In contrast, if
the IMFA infringes on a fundamental right or discriminates against
a "suspect class," the statute is unconstitutional since it does not
protect a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive
means. 31 4 Although the Supreme Court has never held that alien-
age per se is a suspect classification, the IMFA also implicates funda-
mental associational, privacy, and marital rights of citizens and
permanent residents. In other circumstances, the Court has sub-
jected state impairment of these interests to the highest degree of
scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has recognized fundamental constitutional
interests in the marital and familial context, both with respect to the
right to marry and to privacy interests deriving from that relation-
ship. 315 It has not, however, found marriage to be so "fundamen-
tal" that the state may not regulate it. Moreover, there are
314. See, e.g., Through the Looking Glass, supra note 94, at 7.
315. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating a state statute
barring marriage of a noncustodial parent except upon the parent's demonstration that
his children would not become public welfare recipients); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a state law that prohibited the use of contra-
ceptives as an invalid restriction on marital privacy); accord Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
598-600 & n.26 (1977) (reaffirming marital privacy interest); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (right to privacy found to limit the state's regulation of abortion); Loving v.
Virgina, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down a state miscegenation statute on due process
and equal protection grounds). See also Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection
for Personal Lifestyles, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 563, 569 (1977) (stating that if the Court had
merely based Loving on equal protection grounds it would have been "a case addressed
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suggestions in the Court's jurisprudence that the further one moves
from "intimate places, such as the marital bedroom or, more gener-
ally, the home," 31 6 the greater the probability that state restraint of
marital privacy interests will be sanctioned. In Zablocki v. Redhail,
31 7
the Court distinguished between statutes that significantly impair
the individual choice to marry and regulations that merely have an
incidental effect on that right. The Zablocki Court deemed violative
of equal protection a Wisconsin statute that prohibited the marriage
of any noncustodial parent absent a showing that the children were
not likely to become public charges. In Califano v. Jobst,318 however,
the Court found the impairment of marital rights too indirect to
constitute a constitutional violation. TheJobst Court upheld the So-
cial Security Act's denial of benefits to disabled person who married
someone ineligible for such benefits. The Court's obvious concern
about protection of the public purse should be distinguished from
the interests implicated by the IMFA.
Precedent suggests that the Supreme Court may be willing to
sanction more intrusive regulation of family associations in the im-
migration area. The Court has recognized the "interest of a parent
in the companionship, care, [and] custody of his children" in Stanley
v. Illinois and prohibited the denial of parental rights to putative fa-
thers without a hearing.3 19 Yet similar interests were inadequate to
invalidate an analogous INA provision in Fiallo v. Bell. 320 Fiallo af-
firmed the INA's denial of immigration benefits to putative fathers
seeking to enable their alien children to immigrate, although the
statute provided the same benefit to the natural mothers of illegiti-
mate children.3 2' In addition, lower federal courts have permitted
the INA's separation of citizen minor children and alien parents on
the basis of a statutory requirement that a person be 21 or older to
file a visa petition for admission of an immediate relative. 322 These
more to the evils of racial discrimination than to the blessings of marriage"--the Court
affirmed the fundamental importance of marriage by also finding a violation of due
process).
316. See Wilkinson & White, supra note 315, at 588-89 (arguing that "the concept of
seclusion implies protected acts as well as protected places").
317. 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
318. 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
319. 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
320. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
321. The Court, though it reviewed the issue, applied only a rational basis test, hold-
ing that the political choice of admission would be affirmed if supported "on the basis of
a facially legitimate and bona fide reason." 430 U.S. at 794 (citing Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972)).
322. See, e.g., Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1977); see also Newton v.
I.N.S., 736 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1984).
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courts reasoned that the INA did not directly mandate the banish-
ment of minor citizens, even though it was probable under the statu-
tory scheme that they would in fact depart with their parents. In
Kleindienst v. Mandel, the Court stated that the Attorney General
need only provide a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" for
the exclusion of a nonimmigrant scheduled to speak publicly, even
though first amendment associational rights were implicated.
323
This test in effect required nothing more of the government than
provision of a "rational basis" for the exclusion. The courts refused
"to look behind the exercise of ... discretion, nor test it by balanc-
ing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those
who seek personal communication with the applicant."
3 24
These cases indicate, first, that the courts will not second-guess a
congressional entry choice, and second, that even if such a decision
has been made, the judiciary will not engage in meaningful scrutiny
of conditions placed upon the grant of entry, unless it views the con-
straints as significantly impairing important interests. In these cases
either Congress had not made the political entry decision necessary
to satisfy the atrium principle, as it has in the case of IMFA aliens, or
the courts failed to view the congressional constraint as a substantial
impairment of a significant interest. If the illegitimate children in
Fiallo had been admitted, for example, their admission would have
been wholly judicial.
Although the IMFA does not forbid marriage, it directly con-
strains it by requiring aliens who marry during the pendency of pro-
ceedings to leave the country for two years before receiving
immigration benefits. The state-imposed separation is intended to
test the legitimacy of the relationship itself rather than to protect
welfare largess, as inJobst. The fact that the couple has the "option"
of leaving the country does not change the constitutional analysis.
Such reasoning ignores the substantial burdens of avoidance, has
been deemed inadequate to foreclose review in the analogous cir-
cumstances of state impairment of family relationships,3 25 and is
overbroad since almost any constitutional violation could be
avoided by the assumption of this type of burden.
323. 408 U.S. 753, 766-70 (1972).
324. 408 U.S. at 770.
325. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), the Court did not find
that a city zoning ordinance restricting housing occupancy to nuclear families was an
"indirect" constitutional impairment because the petitioner and her grandsons could
have moved out of the city to avoid its effect.
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Communitarian and dignitary values, applied in the context of the
atrium principle, suggest that an extraordinary combination of in-
terests can overcome deep-seated judicial reluctance to subject im-
migration legislation to meaningful review. Accordingly,
"intermediate scrutiny" should apply to review of the IMFA. Often
applied in the context of gender discrimination, intermediate scru-
tiny has also been used to determine the constitutionality of laws
regulating aliens. 326 Under this standard, a statutory classification
will withstand review only if it is "substantially related to a legiti-
mate state interest." 327 As in Plyler, the IMFA regulates an ex-
traordinary merger of interests that implicate a "cross-breeding" of
alienage, a sometimes suspect classification, and marriage, a usually
fundamental right.
328
Notwithstanding the apparent appropriateness of equal protec-
tion intermediate scrutiny, the Supreme Court has never shown will-
ingness to invalidate a federal statutory alienage classification under
that standard. The Court has voided several state alienage classifi-
cation enactments, but commentators have questioned its "serious-
ness" in providing equal protection to aliens in those cases,
suggesting that the holdings could be more rationally attributed to
federal preemption concerns.32 9 Preemption, however, is not a satis-
factory explanation, since the Court has invalidated on due process
and equal protection grounds a federal regulation discriminating
against aliens. 330 The fact that the Court has historically declined to
use intermediate scrutiny only against congressional alienage enact-
ments has resulted in a troubling inconsistency. Francis v. I.N.S.
provides evidence that the lower federal courts have been driven by
326. See Constitutional Law, supra note 216, § 14.3, at 532; L. Tribe, supra note 213,
§ 16-33, at 1613-14.
327. Constitutional Law, supra note 216, § 14.3, at 532.
328. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
329. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding unconstitutional New York's
denial of student financial aid to aliens who would not affirm their intention to apply for
citizenship); Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (invalidating a state
ban against licensing aliens as civil engineers);* Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634
(1973) (invalidating a state exclusion of aliens from civil service employment); In re Grif-
fiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973) (striking down a state ban against the practice of law by
noncitizens). But cf Martin, supra note 159, at 196-99 (citing a line of cases permitting
state preclusion of aliens from certain positions imbued with political connotations as
falling under the Supreme Court's "political function" exception); Bernal v. Fainter, 467
U.S. 216 (1984) (finding that the states may limit alien participation in functions intrinsi-
cally related to the governing process since they are not "full fledged members of the
national community").
330. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a
federal civil service regulation prohibiting the employment of resident aliens).
Vol. 7:20, 1989
Marriage Fraud
this inconsistency to stretch the concept of "rationality" to invali-
date unjustifiable congressional immigration provisions. This has
produced constitutional incoherence.
33 1
The IMFA presents powerful pressures to reconsider the scope of
plenary congressional immigration authority and the impact of im-
migration law on political foreign policy decisionmaking. The Act's
predominantly domestic focus does not impinge on foreign policy
concerns. Moreover, the atrium principle suggests that the statu-
tory classification can be subject to review since Congress has de-
cided to admit the spouses of citizens and permanent residents.
Given the importance of the regulated interests, Congress should be
required to justify denying these particular alien spouses procedural
entitlements afforded to similar persons. If the interests of affected
parties are balanced against the alleged governmental need to deny
procedural entitlements, then, under a Mathews balancing analysis,
the government's position cannot be justified.
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine of equal protection juris-
prudence provides a vehicle for redress of procedural deficiencies
that would avoid the necessity of invalidating the offensive IMFA
provision, but still grant a marital validity hearing. The doctrine has
been indiscriminately applied to over-inclusive state and federal leg-
islation.33 2 In recent years, however, it has fallen into disuse, per-
haps in recognition that practically every statute must at some level
"irrebuttably presume" a problem or classification. Unable to per-
ceive the conceptual limits of the doctrine, commentators have
warned that it has the potential to "gnaw its way through most of
the United States Code."
3 33
At least two factors can serve to restrain potentially overbroad ap-
plication of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine while permitting
its beneficial use. First, the United States Code has survived be-
cause the courts have applied the doctrine only when strict or inter-
mediate scrutiny was warranted by the presence of "a sensitive
classification or ... an important liberty or benefit."33 4 Second, the
doctrine's continuing utility lies in the distinction between its hybrid
331. Constitutional Law, supra note 216, § 14.12, at 644 (indicating that consistency
could be obtained by application of intermediate scrutiny to appropriate alienage cases
"but the split among the justices concerning the proper judicial role in reviewing alien-
age classifications may mean that this area will remain one of great theoretical confu-
sion"). For a discussion of Francis v. I.N.S., 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976), see supra note
298 and accompanying text.
332. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dep't
ofAgric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
333. Dignitary Theory, supra note 210, at 897.
334. L. Tribe, supra note 213, § 16-34, at 1622-24 (citations omitted).
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procedural/due process remedy and orthodox equal protection rule
invalidation. Absolute rule invalidation implies a message from the
court that any use of the over-inclusive factor is impermissible, while
grant of a hearing under the irrebuttable presumption doctrine
merely indicates that the state may make the presumption at issue,
but cannot give it conclusive effect.
33 5
This analysis supports revival of the irrebuttable presumption
doctrine in the context of the IMFA. Intermediate scrutiny is war-
ranted because of the importance of the interests effected. The gov-
ernmental interest in regulating immigration fraud allows it to
consider the timing of marriage formation as a relevant factor, but
not to give this element conclusive effect. The irrebuttable pre-
sumption doctrine offers a moderate resolution of the constitutional
problems presented by the IMFA. By invalidating the statute's over-
inclusive classification and mandating that conditional status hold-
ers be afforded a marriage validity hearing, use of the doctrine pre-
serves the bulk of the Act's regulatory design.
Weinburger v. Salfi3 3 6 seems to present an obstacle to application of
the irrebuttable presumption doctrine to the IMFA. In Saulf, the
Supreme Court held that the Social Security Act's denial of death
benefits to a spouse who had not been married to a wage-earner for
at least nine months prior to his death did not constitute an invalid
statutory presumption. The Court found that "the expense and
other difficulties of individual determinations justified the inherent
imprecision of a prophylactic rule."3 3 7 The Social Security Act's re-
fusal to accord spouses an opportunity to show that they had not
married solely to receive benefits is superficially analogous to the
IMFA's statutory presumption against marriage validity. Nonethe-
less, the interests affected by the statutes are distinguishable. The
rule in Salfi was concerned with preservation of the public treas-
ury3 3 8 and, likeJobst, did not intend to sanction direct impairment of
marital interests or family unity. In contrast, the IMFA presumption
does not avoid administrative costs by eliminating individualized de-
terminations since the INS must bring deportation proceedings to
effect the alien's departure.
3. Constitutional concerns of conditional status holders. The IMFA
raises other constitutional issues beyond the scope of this Article
335. Id. at 1622.
336. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
337. 422 U.S. at 777.
338. 422 U.S. at 771-72 (distinguishing prior cases granting relief against irrebut-
table presumptions on the basis that "a noncontractual claim to receive funds from the
public treasury enjoys no constitutionally protected status").
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that deserve mention. The complexity of the IMFA has led some
legal scholars either to focus on its denial of a marital validity hear-
ing as the only constitutionally relevant issue or to underestimate
the hardships imposed by conditional residence.3 39 Conditional sta-
tus holders, however, are subject to several significant discrimina-
tory statutory classifications. Conditional status holders and
permanent residents are essentially afforded the same legal rights
and privileges, have similar interests, and should therefore be con-
sidered functionally equivalent for constitutional purposes. Condi-
tional status aliens whose familial relationships and liberty interests
have been legislatively impaired should receive the same degree of
judicial protection accorded permanent residents. Some of the
IMFA's provisions relating to conditional status holders may even
fail to satisfy the lesser standard of "rationality." Conditioning the
section 216(c)(4)(B) waiver on the fortuity of which spouse files for
divorce may be irrational. In addition, the section 204(a)(2) restric-
tion on the right of former conditional status aliens to marry other
aliens may trigger constitutional concerns. This provision applies to
a very limited class while exempting others who have similar incen-
tives to engage in fraud; it appears to raise at least a prima facie case
for an equal protection challenge. The courts can be expected,
however, to use the "narrowing by construction"3 40 doctrine to in-
terpret the IMFA in a manner avoiding unnecessary constitutional
inquiry.
By allowing the government to effectuate deportation based upon
a mere preponderance of the evidence, the IMFA impels a constitu-
tional resolution of whether conditional status aliens have a right to
a higher proof standard. In Woodby v. I.N.S., 3 4 1 the Supreme Court
held that INA sections providing that deportation be based on "rea-
sonable, substantial, and probative evidence" governed only the
scope of judicial review and not the government's burden of
proof.3 4 2 The Court refused to close "its eyes to the drastic depriva-
tions that may follow when a resident" is deported, and required the
government to support its case by "clear, unequivocal and convinc-
ing evidence." 343 Although ostensibly a case of statutory interpreta-
tion, Woodby is constitutionally influenced. Similarly, in Santosky v.
Kramer344 the Court invalidated on due process grounds a New York
339. See, e.g., Congress Do Us Part, supra note 64, at 1115-16.
340. See, e.g., National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336
(1974).
341. 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
342. 385 U.S. at 282-83.
343. 385 U.S. at 285-86.
344. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
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statute that authorized termination of parental custody by mere
''preponderance of the evidence," holding that a showing of "clear
and convincing evidence" was required. Since the IMFA is injurious
to interests of family unity, a comparable burden of proof may be
constitutionally mandated. To the degree that the INA affords per-
manent residents the protection of higher proof requirements, an
equal protection argument might also be raised.
Although the IMFA is neutral on its face, its application will have
a disparate impact on women. Given the long history of sexual dis-
crimination under the immigration laws,3 4 5 the judiciary should be
especially sensitive to this problem. Since 1930, women have com-
prised more than half of legal immigrants; two-thirds of all those
legally admitted are women and children.346 These individuals will
undoubtedly constitute the largest class of conditional status hold-
ers. This is a troubling situation because the IMFA provides a dis-
tinct strategic advantage to citizen and permanent resident
spouses-statistically likely to be men-in the event of domestic dis-
pute. As a consequence, there is a high probability that the IMFA
will foster conditions of spousal abuse.347 Women who are condi-
tional status holders may either accept physical abuse during the
two year conditional residence period or leave their husbands and
risk deportation. Moreover, INS rulemaking has failed to declare
that spousal abuse may constitute "good cause" for divorce or for
failure to jointly file a petition to remove conditional status. Under
these conditions, it is not surprising that, despite legal counsel,
some women have continued to tolerate abuse rather than risk
deportation. 3
48
Under Supreme Court precedent, however, statistical proof of the
disproportionate impact of a facially neutral statute is insufficient to
support a gender-based equal protection challenge without demon-
stration of discriminatory purpose.3 49 "Purpose" in this context
connotes more than the mere awareness of discriminatory effect.
345. For example, a 1907 immigration statute provided that a female citizen lost her
citizenship upon marriage to an alien, and women citizens could not extend citizenship
to their children born abroad until 1934. 3 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 1,
§§ 18.5b, l1.6b.
346. Houston, Kramer & Barrett, Female Predominance in Immigration to the
United States Since 1930: A First Look, 18 Int'l Migration Rev. 908 (1984).
347. See Recent Development, Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986:
The Overlooked Immigration Bill, 10 Harv. Women's LJ. 319, 323-24 (1987) (citing L.
Okun, Woman Abuse: Facts Replacing Myths 37 (1986) (statistics indicate that "36.8%
to 66% of all women seeking divorce alleged physical abuse by their spouse")).
348. Interview with Timothy Clark, Attorney for the Legal Services Corporation of
Indiana, Inc. (Sept. 17, 1988).
349. See Constitutional Law, supra note 216, § 14.4, at 543-55.
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Congress must have enacted the law "because of" rather than "in
spite of" its impact upon women. 350 The legislative history of the
IMFA is devoid of evidence suggesting such intent. A similar analy-
sis would probably apply to other arguably inequitable classifica-
tions and distinctions instituted under the IMFA.
Although the above observations indicate the limits of judicial
competence in enforcing constitutional rights, Congress clearly has
a responsibility to ensure that its enactments respect constitutional
standards. Given the absence of an effective "due process of law-
making" theory, however, legislators are not constitutionally re-
quired to search rationally for the truth.35' Lack of such a theory is
regrettable, and as evidenced by a pending recommendation to the
United States Administrative Conference, study and evaluation of
the IMFA should continue.3
52
E. Constitutional Commentary
Rarely has any single legislative enactment raised as many broad
constitutional concerns as the IMFA. The Act challenges the judici-
ary either to abdicate its responsibility to review congressional en-
actments or to bring immigration law into the mainstream of
constitutional jurisprudence. The preceding section of the Article
has attempted to show that the judiciary can fulfill its constitutional
role without unnecessary involvement in the intricacies of political
decisionmaking. Since the IMFA does not significantly involve for-
eign policy considerations, and the importance of the interests at
stake precludes the use of right-privilege reasoning, there is no per-
suasive reason to defer to Congress's choice of procedural protec-
tions. Furthermore, since the atrium principle demonstrates that
judicial scrutiny of the IMFA can be undertaken without usurping
congressional admission prerogatives, the communitarian and dig-
nitary interests of concerned parties may and must be considered.
At a minimum, the judiciary should balance important individual
marital and associational rights against the government's asserted
need for summary procedure. It is the position of this Article that
350. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
351. See Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 197, 225 (1976). But cf
L. Tribe, supra note 213, § 17-3 & n.2 (arguing for a more expansive concept of due
process lawmaking).
352. Legomsky, A Research Agenda for Immigration Law: A Report to the Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States, 25 San Diego L. Rev. 227, 251-52 (1988) (rec-
ommending that a study be conducted of the procedures the INS will employ when it
investigates or adjudicates marital validity). The appropriateness of this recommenda-
tion is reinforced by the past constitutional problems in this area. See, e.g., Sham Mar-
riage Investigation, supra note 30.
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the interests of administrative convenience do not outweigh the im-
portance of protecting fundamental relational rights from arbitrary
impairment.
The analysis presented by this Article suggests that the federal
district court dismissal of the Smiths' claim in Smith v. I.N.S.,3 5 3 was
improper. The court affirmed use of the IMFA's two year banish-
ment provision against due process and equal protection challenge
by citing Mezei and Fiallo without sufficient consideration of the ap-
plicability of those cases.3 54 Likewise, the court held that Plasencia
stood only for the principle that "a resident alien is entitled to fair
procedures before he or she can. be expelled or excluded" but that it
"does not purport to allow courts to substitute theirjudgments as to
who may remain in this country" for those of the legislature.3 55 The
illogical implication of the court's holding is that, irrespective of re-
lational interest and ties to the country, under the constitution only
aliens statutorily designated as permanent residents need be ac-
corded fair procedure. The court neither discussed Chew nor ex-
plained why Mr. Smith's interests could not constitutionally
"assimilate" him to functional permanent resident status-at least
to the extent of requiring a marriage validity hearing. Moreover,
applying bitter-with-the-sweet reasoning, the court found no due
process liberty or property interest3 56 and therefore failed to apply
the Mathews balancing test. The court also mischaracterized the
Smiths' claim. The couple did not seek to challenge Congress's
political decision to admit only bona fide citizens' spouses, but
sought evaluation of the constitutional legitimacy of its presumption
that the timing of their marriage disqualified them from this class.
The court, however, dismissed the couple's equal protection argu-
ment by holding that Sal precluded application of the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine.
Smith stands as a testament to the fact that some courts are still
unprepared to recognize that immigration law is subject to princi-
ples of constitutional jurisprudence. The court effectively sanc-
tioned the government's separation of a family without a hearing and
declined to balance the injury to individual interests against asserted
state need. In failing to fully analyze the principles of relevant cases,
353. 684 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Mass. 1988). See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text
for a description of the Smiths' situation.
354. 684 F. Supp. at 1116-17.
355. 684 F. Supp. at 1117.
356. 684 F. Supp. at 1118.
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the court refused to recognize that the law. has "undergone consid-
erable change since the decisions were rendered in .. .Knauff and
Mezei. ' '3 57 The Smith decision abdicates judicial responsibility by per-
mitting Congress to decide what procedures are constitutionally suf-
ficient even though it has impaired fundamentally important
interests.
V Conclusion and Recommendations
Although it is the prerogative of the legislature to correct what it
perceives as an imbalance in immigration admission policy, in so do-
ing it may not treat the alien's relationships and communal interests
as completely irrelevant. The IMFA's damaging effect on funda-
mental relationships raises substantial questions concerning its con-
stitutionality. The IMFA and the IRCA adjustment of status
provisions 'engraft an unduly complex statutory framework onto the
already top-heavy INA. In addition, the new laws are unnecessarily
severe and were enacted without adequate consideration of past ad-
ministrative experience. An effective immigration policy would at-
tempt to identify fraud early in the administrative process rather
than late. Delaying investigative efforts permits communal and as-
sociational interests to accrue and intensify, exponentially increas-
ing the hardships resulting from subsequent expulsion. The
potential conservation of administrative resources does not provide
adequate justification for this result.
There is strong reason to doubt that the IMFA and adjustment of
status statutes contribute to immigration reform in an equitable, ef-
ficient, or constitutional manner. Even if Congress has no immedi-
ate intention of repealing these laws, certain ameliorative
amendments could improve them. The following provisions would
reduce the unnecessary inequity of these laws, enhance their imple-
mentation, and preserve Congress's fundamental regulatory pur-
pose-without constitutional violation.
The irrebuttable presumption IMFA sections should be repealed and the "ex-
treme hardship" waivers for failure to jointly file a petition to remove condi-
tional status should be amended. Opportunity for hearing should be
provided to permit individuals to show marital good faith. The
hearing should be patterned after the informal showing permitted
aliens who seek waiver of the joint petition filing requirement.3 58
Couples who have entered into "1 1 th hour weddings" primarily for
357. Immigration Process & Policy, supra note 13, at 207.
358. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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immigration benefits would be hard-pressed to demonstrate a legiti-
mate marriage. In contrast, couples like the Smiths might well be
able to demonstrate the bona fide nature of their marriage. It would
also reduce the risk of termination of probationary status through
the failure of a good faith marriage before its second anniversary.
The "extreme hardship waiver" is unworkable as an ameliorative
device to avoid expulsion in such a situation, and the administrative
costs of applying this vague standard are too high. An amended
waiver should be patterned after the lesser standard implemented
under INA section 212(i).3 59 "Hardship" should be considered
without the necessity of showing "extreme" hardship. The INS also
needs to provide guidance as to what constitutes equitable grounds
for waiver, and these grounds should permit recognition of the in-
terests of children born before the grant of conditional status.
The IMFA's incompatibility with domestic family law should be eliminated.
The statute should be amended to render irrelevant distinctions as
to which spouse actually files for a divorce. The INS should define
the concept of "good cause" to file for a divorce, explicitly including
physical and extreme emotional abuse as such grounds. The re-
quirement of demonstrating "fault" should be repealed. It is dupli-
cative in the sense that if one has "good cause" to seek a divorce, a
fault determination is unnecessary, and it is contrary to the require-
ments of domestic no-fault divorces. Finally, the fault concept is too
"inaccessible" to be efficiently implemented.
The discriminatory application of IMFA conditional status should be re-
moved. It is incongruous to permit permanent residents' spouses to
avoid conditional status through manipulation of waiting periods in-
applicable to the spouses of citizens, since the former class of immi-
grants have similar incentives to engage in fraud. The statutory
exemption of spouses and children of occupational immigrants is
also inconsistent. Since the concern of fraud prevention is ignored,
the only logical explanation for the exception appears to derive
from a preference for occupation-based immigration. The adoption
of two proposals could eliminate these disparities. First, the quota
system should be revised to reduce the backlog of permanent resi-
dent nuclear family relatives. These individuals should be afforded
the same immediate entry as immediate relatives of citizens, or at
minimum their visa wait should be reduced to no more than a year.
If the admission delay is equalized between the two groups then dis-
parate treatment will no longer exist. Moreover, a more reasonable
359. See supra note 79.
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visa waiting period will reduce the incentive to engage in fraud.
Second, cessation of the IMFA's preferential treatment of occupa-
tional immigrants would promote rule "congruence."
Burdens of proof that raise constitutional questions should be modified and
children should be provided relief from deportation. Discriminatory statu-
tory burdens of proof that deprive conditional status holders of im-
migration benefits or effectuate their expulsion are of questionable
constitutional validity and should be repealed. Since these individu-
als have ties to the United States and important associational inter-
ests, the statutory procedural burdens that exist for permanent
residents should be applied to conditional status holders. In addi-
tion, children, who may have established substantial contacts and
roots in the country during the period of conditional residence,
should not be automatically deported when marital fraud is discov-
ered. Particularly when the fraud is unilateral rather than bilateral,
the deceived citizen or permanent resident spouse may have formed
a sincere parent-child relationship with his stepchild. Irrespective of
the immigration status of the parent who committed fraud, the legal
relationship of stepchild and parent exists between the innocent
parties and should be sufficient to support the receipt of immigra-
tion benefits if the interested parties consent. This benefit would
require a showing of a genuine relationship between the stepchild
and parent. 360
The INS needs to revise questionable administrative interpretations exacer-
bating an already severe statute. 361 The INS should expressly affirm that
the two year IMFA banishment is inapplicable to aliens who win ex-
pulsion proceedings. Neither the statute nor its legislative history
support a contrary interpretation, which is also unlikely to survive
challenge in the federal courts. Furthermore, the agency should not
seek to apply the two year banishment to aliens who marry during
administrative proceedings other than exclusion and deportation
hearings. In addition, the INS interpretation that an individual serv-
ing her exile overseas cannot file an immigrant petition until the
termination of the two year period has questionable statutory sup-
port and is needlessly severe. Its deleterious effect in the case of the
second preference applicant, already subject to an extended visa
wait, is particularly onerous. If Congress retains the two year exile
360. This recommendation would effectively repeal decisions like Matter of Awwal,
I.D. No. 3056 (BIA, Apr. 4, 1988) (holding that a steprelationship cannot be recognized
where a marriage creating the steprelationship was a sham from its inception, even if it
can be shown that there is a familial relationship).
361. The administrative interpretations referred to are discussed supra at note 137.
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statute, then it should exempt aliens who have served their two year
banishment under the visa system. The tribulations of waiting
couples should end if they have maintained their marital status and
still desire to be reunited in the United States after two years. These
aliens should be assimilated to the status of immediate relatives and
entitled to immediate entry.
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